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LOOSING THE CHAINS: IN-HOSPITAL
CIVIL LIBERTIES OF MENTAL
PATIENTS*
David Ferleger**
Pinel immediately led Couthon to the section for the de-
ranged, where the sight of the cells made a painful impres-
sion on him. Couthon asked to interrogate all the patients.
From most, he received only insults and obscene apostrophes.
It was useless to prolong the interview. Turning to Pinel
Couthon said: "Now, citizen, are you mad yourself to seek
to unchain such beasts?" Pinel replied calmly, "Citizen,
I am convinced that these madmen are so intractable only
because they have been deprived of air and liberty."'
Anne M. signed herself into Paris State Hospital as a
voluntary patient about five months ago. She had left her
husband six months before that and, because he refused to
support her, she became a recipient of public assistance. Un-
able to work as a registered nurse (she had graduated from
nursing school with honors) because of physical problems
and unable to adjust to a welfare budget (her husband was
earning $22,000 annually), Anne M. was forced to sell the
bits of property she had with her, to write checks on an ac-
count which had been closed by her husband and, finally,
to prostitute herself in order to survive. When she could
stand this state of affairs no longer and feared that, in her
depression, she might commit suicide, she went to the hospi-
tal.
On admission, Anne M. was placed in the locked Ad-
missions Unit where, for two weeks, she was forbidden to
leave the floor. At the beginning of the third week, her
* Many of the references included herein are either on file with the
author or may be located at his direction and the LAWYER has not been
able to substantiate the accuracy of such citations. Notation of such refer-
ences has been made where appropriate and further information may be re-
ceived by contacting the author at the following address: Mental Patient Civil
Liberties Project, 121 South 18th St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19103.
** Director, Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, Philadelphia, Pennsyl-
vania; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1969; J.D., University of Pennsylvania
Law School, 1972.
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psychiatrist told her that she could make telephone calls from
a pay telephone and that she could leave the floor and go to
various activities if accompanied by an aide or a group of
other patients. A week later, a nurse told Anne that she had
"grounds privileges"-she could go out onto the hospital
grounds unescorted.
Three times every day Anne, standing in line with the
other patients at the nursing station, awaited her turn to be
handed a tiny paper cup containing two or three pills. Not
long after her admisssion, Anne's hands began to tremble,
her vision became blurred, her mouth and throat seemed to
dry up and her thinking became muddled. Recognizing
these symptoms as possible side-effects of her medication,
she asked a nurse, "What medication are you giving me? Be-
cause of what's happening to me, I just can't keep taking
these pills." The nurse refused to reply except to say, "This
is what the doctor ordered; it will make you feel better."
One morning, Anne refused medication. That afternoon,
the nurse and two aides told her that, unless she cooperated,
she would be placed in the seclusion room. Anne repeated
her complaints about the medicine and demanded that she
be allowed to consult an attorney. Her requests received
no response; the aides began to lead Anne toward the locked
door of the seclusion room. When she went limp, they car-
ried her down the hall and, a few seconds later, dropped her
onto the concrete floor in "seclusion." Anne began to
scream and the nurse entered with a hypodermic needle in
her hand. With the aides holding her down, Anne received
an intramuscular injection in her buttocks. She quickly
fell asleep.
When she awoke, Anne began pounding on the door ask-
ing to be released and to see an attorney, her doctor and the
head of the hospital. She began to tear at the only furni-
ture in the room-a one inch thick mat about six feet
long and two and a half feet wide. After an hour, four aides
wheeled a metal bed into the small room, placed Anne on it
and tied her arms and legs to the four corners. After two
days, Anne agreed to take her medicine and she was re-
leased from seclusion.
Anne's work assignment in the admissions unit was to
wet mop the dayroom every afternoon. Her roommate's job
was to clean and scour the bathroom which was used com-
munally by the twenty-five women on the ward. When Anne
was granted grounds privileges, she was given an Industrial
Therapy assignment in addition to her housekeeping duties;
she typed institutional purchase order forms and answered
the telephone when the Industrial Therapy secretary was out
to lunch. Anne was not paid for this work although, since
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her husband continued to refuse to support her, she had
no spending money to use in the hospital canteen.
After a month in the Admission Unit, Anne was trans-
ferred to another building--one in which the ward was un-
locked. Her medication was reduced and she enjoyed greater
freedom and more respect from the staff. Anne began
to write angry letters to her husband demanding that he
support her and accusing him of infidelity. She gave these
to the ward clerk for mailing. When her husband did not
respond, Anne's letters became angrier and more accusatory.
Her psychiatrist told her that her husband had called the hos-
pital complaining about Anne's communications; the doctor
(who then told Anne that he had been shown each of the let-
lers by the ward clerk before mailing) said that he agreed
with her husband that it would be best if Anne stopped writ-
ing.
Anne continued to write letters home but would ask
her fellow patients to mail them in town when they were
out on a day pass. After further protests from her hus-
band, Anne's psychiatrist ordered Anne transferred back
to the locked ward and ordered that her "group" and
"grounds" privileges be taken away. Not until three weeks
later was Anne permitted to return to the open building.
[A month ago, Anne was again sent "up the hill" when a fel-
low patient with whom she had had an argument falsely
told the doctor that Anne was again secretly writing letters.]
Anne M. is now in seclusion, having refused to wet
mop the dayroom and having thrown a bucket of water at
the nurse in charge of the unit.2
INTRODUCTION
The factual details of patient life in a mental hospital are not
very pleasing; unfortunately, however, they are not totally unex-
pected by those familiar with mental hospital administration. Al-
though the description above of Anne M.'s hospital lifestyle might
seem unduly exaggerated or excessively melodramatic to the out-
sider, it is the daily routine' for hundreds of thousands of our fel-
low citizens.4
Conditions inside mental hospitals have been largely ignored
by the legal community.' Only recently, as the analogies between
2. A composite portrait of a patient at Paris State Hospital.
3. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS (1961) [hereinafter cited as GOFFMAN].
4. In 1969, there were 767,000 persons in or admitted to state and county
inpatient services for the mentally ill. An additional 124,000 were private psy-
chiatric inpatients. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1972, Table
No. 112.
5. With the exception of the right to treatment, most attention has been
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prisons and mental hospitals become more apparent, are those
inmates like Anne M. beginning to receive even the most rudi-
mentary constitutional protections. Consumers of psychiatric
services have recognized the need to organizeO and bring to public
and legal attention objectionable policies and practices; both the
bench and the bar are gradually becoming aware of the fact that
mental patients have been systematically deprived of those civil
liberties deemed basic to a free society.
This article is intended to be an exploratory examination of
various aspects of the "patient phase"7 or "in-hospital" rights of
mental patients. In order to provide the most enlightening per-
spective of hospital environment, those areas of hospital life that
most seriously effect the mental patient's civil liberties will be
discussed and analyzed. 8  Recommendations designed to effec-
tuate adequate safeguards of patient rights while minimizing dis-
ruption of hospital administration will follow each section.
The setting for the analysis discussed above will be an ac-
tual mental hospital. Paris State Hospital,' the subject of the
"case study," is a relatively new facility, about twelve years old,
and sprawls across the hilly country suburbs of a large city in
the northeastern United States. Paris has a patient population ofjust under six hundred, a psychiatric medical staff of twenty-five
physicians (fifteen full-time), and a nursing staff of fifty regis-
tered nurses, seventeen licensed practical nurses and one hundred
ninety aides. I believe that Paris is sufficiently typical to make
devoted to the commitment process-how one gets in-rather than to what hap-
pens once one is in. See, e.g., Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059 (1972); Comment, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the
Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87 (1967).
A notable recent exception is Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), which sets forth minimal constitutional and medical standards for
mental institutions. Even this landmark case, however, did not deal significantly
with many of the issues discussed below.
6. As of March, 1973, there existed in the United States more than sixteen
groups of patients, ex-patients and sympathizers known to this author. Some of
their names illustrate the range of their ideological and political perspectives:
Mental Patients Liberation Project, Insane Liberation Front, Patient Advocacy
Legal Service, Mental Patients Political Action Committee, Center for the
Study of Legal Authority and Mental Patient Status, and Mental Patients Re-
sistance.
7. The term "patient phase" is from GOFFMAN, supra note 3.
8. A wide range of constitutional rights are involved in every area of
hospital life. In the pages that follow one will immediately recognize such
basic constitutional provisions as due process, religious freedom, right to pri-
vacy, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. Additionally, less
traditional concepts such as an individual's freedom of thought and sensation and
a patient's right to receive or refuse certain types of medicinal treatment will
be discussed.
9. For obvious reasons a fictitious name is being used.
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my analysis pertinent to a general inquiry into the restrictions of
civil liberties which mental hospitalization presently entails.10 In
fact, because Paris is a hospital with fairly high standards and a
good professional reputation, the restrictions of rights found there
are probably a representative understatement of the situation at
other state and private institutions.
The first, and major, obstacle in appraising the rights of
mental patients involves physician expertise and the resultant con-
trol over the patient. The mental patient, frequently uninformed,
confused, or scared, is particularly susceptible to an almost un-
impeachable reliance upon the doctor's professional prerogatives
and the associated de-emphasis of the traditional medical-legal
doctrine of informed consent." Physicians' expertise often serves
as a rationalization for an "I know best" attitude toward the pa-
tient that results in a subordination of patient rights to medical
paternalism. When faced with a conflict between recognition or
possible extension of patient rights on the one hand, and medically
indicated treatment on the other, most doctors will not hesitate
to choose the latter without even paying lip service to the former.
Stemming directly from this professional control of the doctor
over his patient is the all too easy assumption that since a person
has been diagnosed12 as "schizophrenic" or "paranoid,"'13 he or
she is incompetent to provide decisive guidance and control re-
garding the ranges or alternatives for treatment. It should be
clearly understood that a mental patient retains all the rights ac-
10. Although the degree of deprivation may vary, patients' experiences in
private mental hospitals are generally similar to those in state mental hospitals
with respect to most of the issues discussed below. Private patients' difficulties
are alleviated somewhat by the frequent personal attention they receive from
their psychiatrists. An extremely useful and exhaustive summary of all the
states' statutory patient rights provisions may be found in S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited as BRAKEL AND
ROCK].
11. Under most circumstances, a physician may not impose treatment upon
a person without first disclosing the probable risks and consequences involved
and then obtaining an "informed consent." The doctor's advice and profes-
sional judgment are held subordinate to the patient's right to control what
happens to his or her body. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350
P.2d 1093 (1960), rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
Unfortunately, a "best interest theory" exception has been carved into the above
doctrine. The doctor is given a privilege, on alleged therapeutic grounds, to
withhold information the disclosure of which would jeopardize the recovery of
an unstable or depressed patient.
12. It is significant that psychiatrists in private practice rarely resort to
such formal designations. The legal, administrative and political (see n.13,
infra) aspects of hospitalization seem to encourage such categorization.
13. With reference to the meaning and effect of such diagnostic labeling,
see generally the work of Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., including THE MYTH OF
MENTAL ILLNESS (1961), LAw LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963) and THE
MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS (1970).
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cruing to individuals outside the hospital unless specific legal pro-
ceedings have been completed.
Much of the research involved in preparing this article is nec-
essarily of a largely personal nature. The observations and con-
clusions herein are based upon my study of a state mental hos-
pital,1" my involvement in providing direct legal services to mental
patients,'" and my experiences at other mental institutions. The
presentation is, inevitably, selective and reflects my biases and a
"legal consumer-oriented" perspective.16 Doctors tend to treat
diseases, not persons. The mental patient becomes a "case" rather
than a personality with unique and complex problems set against
a background of constitutionally protected rights. This article is
not meant, of course, as an attack on the motives of psychiatrists
in general or those at Paris State Hospital. It has been my expe-
rience that hospital doctors sincerely believe that their actions are
for the benefit and welfare of the patient. 17  Sincerity, however,
is the test of neither legality nor morality.
POLICY AND DISCRETION
Two major elements which constantly appear in the hospital
context involve the extent to which hospital policy is inaccessible,
unknown, ignored, violated or forgotten by personnel in their
dealings with patients and the ease of abuse of the wide discretion
possessed by the staff in routine decisionmaking. Each of these
requires some comment as they may cause or encourage denial
of patient rights.
Policy
"Hospital policy" is not the unified body of authority that
the words imply; it'8 is found in many sources and is difficult to
14. D. Ferleger, In-Hospital Civil Liberties of Mental Patients, Part I 1972
(unpublished, on file with the author).
15. The Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, of which the author is
Director, has a contract with a state mental hospital which guarantees access for
the provision of independent services to patients.
16. For an enlightening and knowledgeable exposition of this contrast see
Sparer, On the Matter of "Community Relations": The Consumer Movement
and The Albert Einstein Medical Center (1971), 2 MATERIALS ON HEALTH LAW
591 (1972).
17. Recall the remarks of Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928):
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding
18. This discussion of "hospital policy" is limited to those aspects of it
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locate or understand. At Paris State Hospital, policy may be lo-
cated in the Physicians' Handbook, the Nursing Manual, the Pa-
tient and Relative Manual, the state mental health statute, regu-
lations promulgated pursuant to that statute, directives and mem-
oranda from the various offices of the state Department of Public
Welfare, and directives and memoranda issued by the Hospital
Director and subordinate hospital administrators. The semi-au-
tonomous physician also makes decisions which are properly
treated as contributing to overall policy. Additionally, the nurs-
ing staff contributes to the relevant hospital policy as it deter-
mines the rules which govern each unit, ward and building. Fi-
nally, various meetings and other interactions, both formal and in-
formal, among administrators, staff and doctors are factors shap-
ing hospital policy.
The diversity of hospital policy confuses its creators and par-
ticipants as much as it does the outside observer. I have spent
many hours attempting to unravel the contradictory threads of
policy provided by staff and patients.19 It was not unusual to
be told one thing by a nurse on the north ward of a floor and
the opposite by a south ward nurse a minute later. On occasion,
as when two aides responded to the question "Are mechanical
restraints used when a patient is locked in seclusion?" one with
a "yes," the other with a "no," the contradictions came simul-
taneously. The very first day of observation at the hospital, I
was told there was absolutely no censorship of mail; a manual for
patients and their relatives stated that there was censorship; a
nurse told me she didn't know "if there's a policy on it."
A related issue is the lack of uniformity in applied policy.
While the staff must retain a certain degree of flexibility to work
out its own modes of operation, certain variations, unjustifiable
on legal or rational grounds, are needlessly confusing or inappro-
priate, and frequently contrary to superceding statutory or hos-
pital policy. For example, if one refuses oral medication, he may
get "a needle in the ass," be secluded, lose a day's grounds priv-
ileges 0 or just be left alone. The sanction applied may depend
upon one's location within the hospital, the decision of the nurs-
ing staff, or one's doctor. On some wards, a patient can take a nap
in his or her room; on other wards, this is impossible. Depending
which refer to or affect in-hospital liberties. I am not including in the term
such things as budgetary, staffing, dietary or maintenance policy.
19. At Paris and other institutions, I have interviewed persons at all
levels-administrators, doctors, nursing staff, social workers, volunteers and pa-
tients.
20. "Grounds" is the opportunity to leave a locked ward and go outside or
visit other areas of the hospital unescorted.
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on the local rules, a patient may or may not keep a lock on a pri-
vate locker. Some units have spot searches of patient rooms and
others have regular weekly searches while another has none at all.
On some wards, no outgoing mail is examined; elsewhere, nurses
and aides examine all such mail despite an express statutory pre-
scription that certain mail shall be sent "sealed," that is, free from
any inspection whatsoever.2 1
Other "uniform" policies are ignored or violated, occasion-
ally with the acquiescence of the policy-makers. Seclusion orders,
for example, are routinely given "p.r.n.'"22 although the rule is to
the contrary. Rather than being given the choice between coop-
erative medication and leaving the hospital (as is official policy),
the voluntary patient may be forcibly tranquilized. Particularly
flagrant is the discrepancy between the hospital's mechanical re-
straint order form and actual restraint practices. The form indi-
cates that only certain apparatus may be used, namely, camisoles,
sheets and towels; however, a box which I saw labelled "Re-
straints" contained many items (e.g., leather straps and a gag)
forbidden by the order form.
Patients are uninformed about hospital policy. Their inter-
ests in it range in intensity from mild curiosity to ravenous hunger
but, at present, nearly all patients are unsatisfied. Paris has a
Patient and Relative Manual which, for the most part, deals with
such matters as visiting hours, the location of the barber shop
and automobile parking regulations; there is a small section relat-ing some of the statutory rights in a misleading manner.2  The
Patient and Relative Manual is outdated (it is four and a half
years old), sometimes inaccurate and not very comprehensive.
At any rate, despite official policy to the contrary, patients fail to
receive the manual at all.
Whether or not they are concerned with "policy," patients'
concern about what is being done to them and under what au-
thority is very real. They have a right to know these things and
to be aware of the options available to them and to the hospital.
Patients would certainly benefit if they were able to cite chapter
and verse on their own behalf, and abuse or avoidance of hos-
21. The Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1969[hereinafter cited as the "Pennsylvania Act"], PA. STAT. tit. 50, §§ 4101, et seq.(1969), guarantees the patient "sealed communications to the director [of theinstitution], any member of his family, the department [of public welfare], the
court, if any, which committed him, and the Governor." PA. STAT. tit. 50, §
4123(1) (1969).22. Abbreviation for the Latin pro re nata (according as circumstances
may require). DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (24th ed. 1965).23. For example, the word "sealed" is omitted from this manual's refer-
ence to the statutory provision on mailed communications. See note 21, supra,
for text of statute.
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pital policy (whether intentional or unintentional) by hospital
staff would be deterred.24
Recommendations
1. A short but comprehensive description of hospital rules and
policy regarding patient-phase civil liberties should be prepared.
This should include relevant materials from such sources as the
local equivalent of Paris' Physicians' Handbook and Nursing Man-
ual, and the state mental health statute and its regulations. Ruling
case law should also be incorporated. All physicians, staff and
patients should receive a copy of the summary.25
2. Those policy areas within which wards or buildings may vary
their rules should be clearly defined and all such variations should
be clearly posted within view of patients in the unit and inserted
as an addendum to the summary rules description suggested
above.
3. The Physicians' Handbook, the Nursing Manual, the statute
and the regulations issued pursuant thereto, and all memoranda
and directives from the central state authority and the hospital
administration should be available in an open hospital area (per-
haps the library, chapel or recreation area) to patients, their rela-
tives and staff. Theoretically, most, if not all, of this material is
already public information available in a law library, the hospital
director's office or the state capitol. Presently, the people most
affected by the material, the patients, have the least access to it.26
There is no justification for this situation.2 7
4. Assuming the rise of "asylum-lawyers" with abilities and func-
tions similar to those of jailhouse lawyers,2" mental hospitals
24. If they were familiar with all the rules, nurses and aides could more
easily decline to carry out doctor's orders which are contrary to hospital policy.
As a collective solution to this problem, unionized hospital workers might
argue that they may not properly be directed to violate patient rights and that,
therefore, some codification of patient rights is required.
25. With reference to the analogous prison situation, it has been stated:
Without a set of written rules and regulations, enforcement of disci-
pline in the prison will, by definition, always be arbitrary and capri-
cious, for a most fundamental notion of the rule of law is prior notice
of what in fact is deemed by the authorities to be illegal.
RunovsKy, THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 24 (1973).
26. As an interim advocate's approach to this problem, the Mental Patient
Civil Liberties Project has begun to distribute a Patient Rights Manual, 3-4
ROUGH TIMES 12 (1972), at a local mental hospital. See also, B. ENNIS & L.
SIEGAL, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS (1973), a useful handbook for pa-
tients, laypersons and newly-interested attorneys.
27. Concern over the limited content of prison libraries has been expressed.
Compare, e.g., In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504
(1970) with Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961).
28. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) held unconstitutional blanket
prohibitions on prison inmate assistance.
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should also make available relevant legal materials to facilitate
mutual inmate assistance.20
Discretion
The discretionary power of the nursing and aide staff is im-
mense. Neither the hospital administration nor the medical staff
is in a position to review the thousands of decisions made daily
at that level. Yet that is the level at which nearly all patient-
hospital contact occurs. That is the level at which patients' rights
and liberties may be most severely threatened. And, from the
medical-therapeutic point of view, that is the level which has the
most impact on cure and recovery.80
A few examples of the areas in which discretion is exercised
will illustrate the potential for abuse. When a doctor orders that
seclusion or mechanical restraints be used "p.r.n.," as is necessary,
it is the aide or nurse on the floor who decides what sorts of be-
haviors necessitate such action. I have heard an aide threaten a
patient (who was sitting quietly watching television and refused
to rise at the request of the aide) with the exercise of his "discre-
tion": "I've got a room for you . . . !"
Unlike the open unlocked wards, the locked units do not
have pay telephones within ready access of patients; an aide must
accompany the patient out through the locked door to the phone
booth. Of course, the opportunity, frequency and duration of pa-
tient telephone communications thus becomes dependent upon de-
cisions made by the lower-level staff.
If a patient is deemed incapable of overseeing his or her
spending money, the money is held for the patient in the nursing
station and released only upon request. A nurse indicates that
such capability is ascertained in this free-wheeling manner: "By
his actions, you can tell." Of course, this conclusion is reached
without regard to formal guardianship or incompetency proceed-
ings. The staff at Paris State Hospital often takes advantage of the
29. Although Johnson v. Avery did not directly touch that point, it is
difficult to escape the logic that if an inmate has the right to the
assistance of another inmate in the preparation of legal material, he
cannot be absolutely restrained from acquiring the requisite knowledge
to assist himself in the preparation of his petitions and applications.
To reason otherwise would be effectively to grant writ-writers an in-
prison monopoly on legal knowledge to which indigent or illiterate in-
mates must resort for the effective presentation of their complaints.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE EMERGING RIGrrs OF THE
CONFINED 49 (1972).
30. A major treatment modality in mental hospitals is called "milieu ther-
apy" in which the therapeutic agents are the human and physical environ-
ments-the hospital itself. E. ROSEN & I. GREGORY, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY
220-21 (1965); A. STANTON & M. ScnWArZ, THa MENTAL HOSPITAL: A STUDY
OF INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS AND TREATMENT (1954).
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leverage offered by the fact that the patient's cigarettes or money
is inaccessibly stored within the nursing station on the locked
wards. A young adolescent patient knocked on the station door.
This conversation ensued:
Patient: "May I have a cigarette?"
Nurse: "That depends on how you did in school today."
(The nurse then looked at the patient and noticed that he
was sad and upset. In a concerned voice, she asked:) "How
do you feel? What's the matter?"
Patient: (mumbles inaudibly)
Nurse: (back to original voice) "How did you do in school?
Did you pay attention? Did you learn any new words?"
The young man walked away and never received his cigarette.
There are no easily implemented actions to counter abuse
of discretion. It is fundamentally a problem of educating staff
and raising individual consciousness to a higher level of empathy
and compassion. The nurses' and aides' perceptions of the ad-
ministrators' expectations are also crucial. If the staff knows that
a four or five day seclusion period for a minor infraction is "O.K."
with the hospital director and the state capitol, then their self-
imposed restrictions on such discretionary decisions will remain
loose and casual. On the other hand, if the staff knows that the
policy-makers are concerned with providing a more free atmos-
phere with minimal restrictions on liberty, routine determinations
will undoubtedly be affected. 31
Recommendations
1. Penalties for violation of hospital rules should be clearly de-
termined and posted.
2. Staff training on the use of discretion should be emphasized. 2
31. Pennsylvania ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, Civil
No. 72-2521 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 16, 1973), is a case in which the state has
joined with a nurse in filing suit against a private mental hospital which fired
the nurse after she publicly criticized her former employer, a state mental hos-
pital. The suit seeks to guarantee hospital employees' first amendment right
to criticize institutions and seeks to make clear the state's interest in deterring
improper practices at the staff level.
32. Again, the analogy between prisons and mental hospitals seems appro-
priate; the following statement regarding prison guards is equally applicable to
the staff in mental hospitals:
In fact, prison guards may be more vulnerable to the corrupting in-
fluence of unchecked authority than most people. It is well known
that prisons are operated on minimum budgets and that poor salaries
and working conditions make it difficult to attract high-calibre person-
nel. Moreover, the "training" of the officers in dealing with ob-
streperous prisoners is but a euphemism in most states. Landman v.
Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 140 (4th Cir. 1966).
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3. Staff should plainly indicate their actions and their reasons
therefor within the patient's hospital record.33
4. Proper medical standards 4 should be closely followed; that
is, reports of incidents and complaints should include the pa-
tient's description and explanation. It's suggested that a form
be used so the patient may write or dictate his or her version of
the incident and that this form be attached to the staff report.
Both reports, of course, would become part of the medical rec-
ord.35
5. An effective grievance consideration mechanism should be es-
tablished. Such mechanisms may take a number of forms de-
pending upon the resources available to the hospital. One simple
and inexpensive method is to provide "Suggestion and Complaint"
forms to patients with guaranteed intramural delivery to the hos-
pital director's office or mail delivery to the state capitol. Another
possibility is a grievance committee composed of staff and pa-
tients which would investigate and take action on complaints.
However, the most effective method of assuring that low level dis-
cretionary decisions will be subject to potential review is to pro-
vide a non-hospital "ally/advocate" (with the resources to insti-
tute litigation) to represent the patient to the administration.
Whatever method is selected, a grievance consideration
mechanism would have an effect far beyond settlement of an in-
dividual case. Enforced accountability to the consumers of their




There is no aspect of patient behavior which escapes the
machinations of the privilege system. All actions or omissions
carry the potential of influencing the acquisition, retention or loss
of privileges. Patients devote much of their thought and energy
33. See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, STANDARDS FOR
PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES (1972).
34. Paris State Hospital standards require that "the complaint of others re-
garding the patient is included [in the medical records] as well as the patient's
comments." Medical Records (for Paris State Hospital), in accordance with
the requirements of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and
the Department of Welfare, paragraph (a) (3) (on file with the author).
35. See, e.g., Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637, 642-43 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
where the court stated:
On their face, the records must be adequate to demonstrate the propri-
ety . . . of the challenged decision. If the records are not adequate




to the procurement of privileges and the fear and avoidance of
their restriction. The big stick wielded by hospital staff is the
withdrawal of privileges-in hospital terminology, "restriction." '
At Paris State Hospital, after an initial period of total restric-
tion (lasting one to two weeks), the new patient is given "group"
or "grounds" privileges. Usually, group privileges are granted
first and grounds follow at a later date. "Group privileges permit
the patient to attend activities with groups of other patients under
the supervision of an employee, volunteer or relative."317 Refer-
ring to grounds privileges, the Patient and Relative Manual states:
Patients accepting ground privileges agree to the following:
(1) that they will not permit these privileges to interfere
with their treatment program and will attend all activities
as scheduled;
(2) not to leave the hospital grounds;
(3) that they will restrict their movement on the grounds
to the regular paved roads and observe the north boundary
of the green benches on First Avenue before Darby Road,
and the south boundary of the employees' cafeteria build-
ing.
(4) not to loiter in front of or to enter Building #3 unless
they have a specific assignment there;
(5) to return to their own ward when the street lights go on
in the evening, except to attend planned activities in the
Recreation Building and then return directly to their ward.
Patients are requested not to enter the South Hall of the first
floor of Building #4 or any physician's office unless he has
an appointment, and not to enter any other ward areas. Pa-
tients may visit on the patios or in the lobbies of other build-
ings.
Patients having ground privileges are requested to sign out in
a designated book in each ward so that they may be lo-
cated at any time.38
Another sort of privilege provides the opportunity to leave the
hospital property for the day, the weekend or, occasionally, for
longer periods.
36. That the privilege system has infiltrated into the most trivial aspects
of daily existence, with a depth that exceeds its justification, may be illustrated
by the following two signs posted in the Recreation Building, the first by the
four bowling lanes and the second sign in front of vending machines just
within the building's entrance:
DO NOT ROLL BALLS DOWN THE ALLEY IF YOU ARE NOT
BOWLING. RESTRICTION WILL FOLOW.
PLEASE DISPOSE OF ALL TRASH IN THE WASTE BASKETS.
if not disposed properly-new restrictions will follow.
37. Paris State Hospital, Patient and Relative Manual 11 (1967) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter cited as Patient and Relative Manual].
38. Id. at 12-13.
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According to hospital policy, decisions to grant privileges,
and later decisions to revoke or regrant them, are made by the
patient's psychiatrist and entered by that person on the patient's
medical record. Actually, my observations indicate that the nurs-
ing and aide staff possesses the effective decisionmaking power
with reference to everything following the routine initial lifting
of restrictions.
Privileges may be revoked for a myriad of reasons. Two
patients note that revocation will result from "getting in any kind
of trouble" or "if you don't do what you're 'spozed to." Privileges
are routinely withdrawn by the staff as punishment, for example,
for refusal of medication or a refusal to clean up one's room or to
perform one's work assignment. The above "offenses" usually
call for a one day confinement to the ward. Less well-defined be-
havior, however, may result in the same sanctions. To illustrate:
One day, while lunching in the snack bar, I met Gloria, a pa-
tient whom everyone seemed to know. She was wiping tables,
singing and swaying to juke box music, being friendly and ex-
changing comments with people. A week later, I learned that
Gloria had been restricted to her "open" building for "carrying
on." Asked for a clarification of this term, a nurse could state
only that Gloria had been "singing and dancing in the canteen
and hanging on to people."
The curious coexistence of punishment and therapeutic mo-
tives are evidence in these not wholly logical comments by a
nurse:
They would not get grounds while they are refusing medi-
cine because then you're defeating your whole purpose.
You're rewarding them with grounds when they're not really
taking their medicine. You wouldn't give them grounds if
they were still refusing their medicine. That doesn't make
sense. If they're well enough to have grounds, they're
well enough to take their medicine.
I heard another nurse justify the use of seclusion for a patient on
the grounds that, for the particular patient, revocation of priv-
ileges was "not enough punishment." Two additional staff mo-
tives are prevention of unauthorized leaves and a concern with
"appearances," that is, publicly appropriate behavior; both mo-
tives are illustrated by the following reply of a nurse to my re-
quest for reasons for removal of privileges:
Like I have a patient, Sandra Myers. Sometimes she packs
her clothes and says, "I'm going home. I'm going home."
Then I hold her grounds. That's one instance.
Another instance is someone who is very upset like Jano Gan-
zer. She would scream at the top of her lungs, "You murder-
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ers, you torture me. You're making my nose big." Very de-
lusional in her talk. Not only delusional but screaming at the
top of her lungs and offending other people. We'll hold
her grounds for that afternoon. She quiets down. She will
keep on doing it for about ten minutes but she knows she has
to quiet down because she can't go down to the lobby and act
like that. I pointed out to her that if she's not able to act
appropriately, then she's not able to go down.
No review of privilege decisions is practically available to pa-
tients. Despite hospital policy, the nurses' notes and doctors' or-
ders in the medical record most often include (though not as a
rule) only the staffs version of the incident which precipitated the
decision. Patients confirmed that they were rarely asked for their
side of the story and complained that they were frequently left
in the dark as to the reasons for their restriction.
Discussion
From the hospital's point of view, the privilege system pro-
vides incentive for positive behavioral change as it performs its
therapeutic function in the ward's milieu.3 9  A commentator is
under great pressure to tread lightly in this area because of the
fundamental importance of the privilege system to the hospital
organization. Mail censorship or room searches, for example,
could be abandoned with a minimum of pain and suffering; how-
ever, weakening or eliminating the privilege system might be so
threatening to the power of the staff as to preclude serious con-
sideration of its desirability.
While patients are manipulated by staff into desired behavior,
they also learn to use the privilege system for personal advantage.
Alert patients, if they want to leave the hospital or maximize their
freedom within it, quickly learn how to be a "good" patient; that
is, they learn which overt behaviors and verbalisms will elicit re-
wards and which will result in punishment. Though hallucina-
tions, anxiety or paranoia may remain, they are hidden from the
staff by the "good" patient. One possible professional response to
this adaptation is to applaud the patient for learning the skills of
lying and pretense which pervade life "outside." Another reac-
tion is concern for the masking of some of the very human prob-
lems in living which might have prompted the patient's hospitali-
zation-problems which, since unresolved, are likely to continue
to create difficulty after release. The entire constellation of issues
which arise from this "good patient" syndrome illustrates a basic
shortcoming in the privilege system.
39. See generally GOFFMAN, supra note 3.
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Another troublesome aspect of the privilege system is the
subjection of people who are already deprived of their liberty, to
further restriction on the basis of unreasonable, minor, often triv-
ial justifications. "Carrying on" or "upsetting people" outside the
hospital earn one a bit of social ostracism and possibly the loss
of an acquaintance or two; such behavior would not result, as it
does in the hospital, in losing the "privilege" of walking in the
sun or using the telephone.40
Procedural due process would require, at the least, accurate
and full hospital records as to staff actions and the reasons there-
for to assure that all relevant information (including the patient's
explanation) has been taken into account and that a permissible
decision has been made. 41
A potential legal restriction on the privilege system is the set
of absolute in-hospital rights established by Wyatt v. Stickney,42
the landmark right to treatment case. Although the Wyatt court
carefully permitted the limitation of some "privileges" by hospital
professionals (e.g., the right to visitation and telephone commu-
nications), 4 there are some rights which were recognized with
no qualifications whatsoever. For example, "[p]atients have a
right to be outdoors at regular and frequent intervals, in the ab-
sence of medical considerations,' 44 the right to regular exercise
periods and facilities, 45 the right to religious worship, 40 the right
to interaction with the opposite sex,47 and the right to a television
in the dayroom.48  Following other decisions in the mental health
law field, the Wyatt court held that "patients have a right to the
least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the purposes of
commitment. '4a  This right would include the right to privileges
if the person's mental condition were such that privileges could
40. The attempt to distinguish the hospitalized patient from the psy-
chiatric outpatient or physically ill person on the basis that the men-
tal patient must be controlled (by drugs, locked doors or restraints)
to prevent physical injury is not persuasive. Mental illness is not
necessarily equatable with danger....
GAY, DEFICIENCIES OF COMMUNITY BASED FACILITIES IN RELATION TO ST.
ELIZABETH'S PATIENTS 2 (1972).
41. On judicial review of hospital decisions regarding internal administra-
tion, the issue is whether the hospital "has made a permissible and reasonable
decision in view of the relevant information and within a broad range of discre-
tion." Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
42. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
43. Id. at 379.




48. Id. at 382.
49. Id. at 379. The doctrine of "least restrictive alternative" was first
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be taken advantage of without adverse consequences; use of the
privilege system as punishment or for manipulation of behavior
would, under this reasoning, be prohibited. 50
Recommendations
The privilege system is punishment therapy. It could be oth-
erwise. It could be a system of enforceable community rules ac-
cepted as legitimate by all concerned while recognizing the ab-
solute rights described above. To effect this suggested transfor-
mation, the following recommendations are made:
1. Offenses and punishments should be clearly defined in a pub-
lished and distributed "schedule."
2. Patients should have a significant part in formulating the
community rules.
3. The rules should govern all members of the hospital com-
munity. In addition to sanctions for patient offenses, there should
be sanctions against a nurse or aide who, for example, secludes
without a doctor's order, and against a physician who revokes a
patient's privileges without sufficient cause.
4. An uncomplicated "judicial" system should be established for
minor restrictions to resolve disputed questions of fact." Admin-
istrative review should be available.
ROOM SEARCHES
Description
One assigned duty of the nursing and aide staff at Paris State
Hospital is to make regular searches of patients' rooms. Ac-
cording to the institution's assistant superintendent, decisions as
applied in the mental health commitment area in Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d
657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Wexler, The Administration of Psychiatric
Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIz. L. REV. 1 (1971). This
concept was extended to the in-hospital situation by Covington v. Harris,
419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
50. For an excellent examination of the status of "absolute" rights within
the mental hospital see Wexler, Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification,
Token Economics and the Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 81, 93-95 (1973).
51. A number of prisoners' rights cases have articulated procedures for use
in disciplinary actions for minor violations. These would be appropriate for
use in the mental hospital privilege revocation context. Bundy v. Cannon,
328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Mo. 1971) required (1) representation by another inmate
or staff member, and (2) a written decision with a reasoned basis for findings
and recommendations. For minor inmate offenses within the Virginia penal
system, a federal district court compelled (1) verbal notice, (2) an impartial
tribunal, and (3) a chance to cross-examine the complaining officer, and to




to the extent and scheduling of searches are made by the nurses
on the ward.
Actual practice appears to vary widely. One nurse told me
that spot checks are made once a week. Other units make regu-
lar thorough searches of bedside cabinets in all patient rooms and
dormitories. Often, patients do not know that these searches are
made because they are accomplished while the patients are at
meals or about on the grounds.
Policies are often embodied in notices posted inside the nurs-
ing station (beyond the view of patients). For example:
June 28, 1971
THE AIDES ARE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A THOR-
OUGH SEARCH OF BEDSIDE CABINETS ONCE A
WEEK (UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED). THIS IS
TO CONFISCATE MATCHES AND/OR OTHER CON-
TRABAND. THE AIDES ARE TO SELECT THE DAY
& TIME AND FOLLOW THROUGH.
/s/ Miss Random
"Contraband" apparently includes, in addition to matches,
such articles as sharp or pointed instruments, drugs, alcoholic
beverages, any glass articles, spiked heels, umbrellas and razor
blades. These items are listed in the Patient and Relative Man-
ua152 as items which "[v]isitors are not permitted to bring. 58
I have not been able to locate any list of officially-designated con-
traband, nor are patients given any such list.
Occasional specific searches are conducted in addition to
the routine ones. For example, if a safety razor was found miss-
ing after the "sharp count,"54 every room on the locked ward
would be searched. In an unlocked ward or building, "the whole
building is given a shakedown," as one nurse told me, if a par-
ticular patient were suspected of possessing contraband or if there
were a belief on the part of the staff (based either on an inform-
ant's tip55 or unsubstantiated feelings) that some patient might
have violated the rules. This is the general policy as confirmed
by the hospital psychiatrists and administrators.
The major justification for this stringent policy is, of course,
hospital security. The hospital administration seeks to deter or
52. See Patient and Relative Manual, supra note 37 at 11.
53. Id.
54. "Sharp count" is the regular check and count of sharp and pointed ob-
jects (e.g., safety razors, scissors) which are kept on the ward for limited
patient use and are locked in a nursing station cabinet.
55. When acting pursuant to an informant's disclosures, the hospital staff
does not limit the search to the location or person described by the informant
because, I was told, "he's probably lying."
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prevent suicide attempts, assaults and other untoward events. The
factual basis for this concern may be indicated by an analysis
of Paris State Hospital's official records of all incidents for Feb-
ruary, 1972; during this month, 16,646 patient/days of service
were provided.
There were a total of four relatively trivial self-inflicted in-
juries during that month, all occurring in the unlocked wards.
These were described as follows: (1) drank soap and bleach so-
lution, (2) abrasion of head, (3) attempted strangulation, and
(4) punched door-injured hand. Seven patients were attacked
by other patients, three others were bitten and one was sexually
assaulted. There was one case of illicit use of drugs and a similar
case involving alcohol. These seventeen incidents yield a rate of
only one per 979 patient/days.
Discussion
The extremely low rate of incidents at Paris indicates that
there is little problem with disruptive or dangerous patient be-
havior. Although it may be argued that this is due simply to the
effectiveness of the contraband policy, other evidence suggests
that this is not the case. The fact is that the overwhelming ma-
jority of mental patients in the United States are not dangerous
to themselves or others.5 6 Most patients could, without adverse
effect, leave the hospital for outplacement in the community-in
nursing homes, foster homes, halfway houses, the patients' own
homes or special personal care facilities.57 Thus, although the
mental hospital may legitimately be concerned with the potential
for danger created by the presence of items which would facilitate
56. See note 40, supra.
57. One major study of 4,000 patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Wash-
ington, D.C., found that "68% of the patient population has no behavior prob-
lem which could limit outplacement. Thus, none of these patients could be
considered 'dangerous to themselves or others' by any definitions of the terms."
Abraham & Bucker, Preliminary Findings from the Psychiatric Inventory 3
(1971) (on file with the author). Those with problems were described as
"assaultive" (10% of the total population), "destructive" (5%), "suicidal"
(3%), "sexual" (3%), "alcoholic" (7%) and "other" (4%). Id. at Table I.
Another commentator concluded that:
there is a large proportion of the patient population, 43 per cent,
whose presence in the hospital cannot readily be explained in terms
of their psychiatric condition. Their presence suggests the putative
character of the societal reaction to deviance, and that for at least a
near majority of the patients, their status is largely ascribed rather
than achieved.
T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 168 (1966). See
also Mendel, Brief Hospitalization Techniques, 6 CURRENT PSYCHIATRIC THERA-
PiEs 310 (1966) which discusses a study in which 75% of almost 3,000 patients




a self-inflicted injury or assault, the need for security is, at best,
a minimal one; tight security measures should have, as their tar-
get population, only that minority of patients who are identified as
"dangerous. "58
All patients have a vital and constitutionally protected inter-
est in maintaining their own bit of private space and property in
the otherwise impersonal institution;50 during searches for alleg-
edly dangerous contraband, the nurse or aide may peruse and
handle private papers, diaries, books, secreted foods, contracep-
tives or other items. The patient has the right to keep these and
other personal effects from the eyes and hands of others. The
authors of the Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men." 60  Surely, each and every mental hospital patient
cannot be thought to have abandoned in all respects their right
to be left alone. Treatment of a person for "mental illness" is
no justification for denial of the constitutional and human right
to privacy. 61
Furthermore, the fourth amendment prohibits both whole-
sale shakedowns of wards and buildings on tips from often anony-
mous or untrustworthy informants, and routine checks of per-
sonal property in bedside cabinets and elsewhere.
Lankford v. Gelston62 was an action to enjoin mass police
investigation of more than 300 locations, mostly private homes
and most involving searches, in an unsuccessful effort to locate
"armed and dangerous" robbers. At the hearing, police officers
"testified that in serious cases it was routine to make searches of
homes on the basis of anonymous calls. 6 3  The court ordered
such searches without probable cause enjoined; its discussion in-
cluded the following paragraph which applies as well to both the
serious and routine situations facing the mental hospital worker:
In ordering the issuance of an injunction we have not blotted
from our consideration the serious problems faced by the
58. There are doubtless some patients who want the protection from re-
duced self-control which is offered by the search-and-find hospital policy. Es-
pecially for truly voluntary patients who hospitalized themselves in order to
work through their destructive feelings and, in effect, contracted with Paris for a
"safe" environment, this motive must be respected.
59. Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
60. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
61. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 313, 379 (M.D. Ala. 1972) explicitly
holds that mental "[p]atients have a right to privacy and dignity."
62. 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
63. id. at 200.
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law enforcement officer in his daily work. His training
stresses the techniques of the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals, and what seems to him to be the
logical and practical means to solve a crime or to arrest a sus-
pect may turn out to be a deprivation of another's consti-
tutional rights. . . . While fully appreciating the exceed-
ingly difficult task of the policeman, a court must not be
deterred from protecting rights secured to all by the Con-
stitution. 6 4
Simply because the mental health professional sees the shakedown
as the "logical and practical" means to locate offending patients
does not justify depriving them of their constitutional rights.
This is especially so in the hospital situation where dozens of in-
nocent persons will suffer the inconvenience and indignity of a
vain search so that the authorities may locate the one person who
may have in his or her possession an item which may, at some
indeterminate future time, cause an unspecifiable harm, which
.may or may not be serious.
The United States Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal
Court,6 5 held that an inspector attempting to enforce a local hous-
ing code could not make a general area inspection without a
warrant. The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment ap-
plied to routine periodic inspections conducted under regulatory
laws. It said:
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his
private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.
. . . The practical effect of this system is to leave the
occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field.
This is precisely the discretion to invade private property
which we have consistently circumscribed by a require-
ment that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. 66
Similarly, although the nurses and aides are not law enforce-
ment authorities and routine searches may arguably be a proper
interest on the part of the hospital, the institution must meet the
constitutional test of reasonableness to justify intrusions into a
patient's effects without consent. 7 It is highly unlikely, because
of their condition, 8 that most patients would come into posses-
64. Id. at 204.
65. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
66. Id. at 530-32.
67. It would be impermissible to distinguish between the mental hospital
situation and that in Lankford and Camara on the grounds that those cases
involved searches of persons' residences. "[T]he fourth amendment protects
people, not places." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In any
case, the mental hospital is, at least for a temporary time, the home of the
subject of the search.
68. See notes 56 and 57 supra.
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sion of contraband. Thus, it is difficult to discern any legitimate
reason for discretionary routine searches of all rooms and dormi-
tories.8 9
Recommendations
A policy which would be constitutional and cognizant of hu-
man dignity would be to ban mass periodic and shakedown
searches entirely and to allow searches only where there is prob-
able cause to believe that the contraband rules have been violated
and that the subject of the search is the violator.70
A Maryland court has defined procedures which must be
followed in searches conducted at the Patuxent Institution for
adult "defective delinquents, ' 71 a special facility whose specific
responsibility is to provide psychatric treatment for offenders com-
mitted there. The following suggestions are based upon that
court's determinations.
1. Searches must be conducted with maximum respect and min-
imum discomfort to the patients.
2. Only items prohibited by explicit rules may be confiscated.
3. All items removed in searches of rooms and dormitories must
be replaced without damage.
69. Fourth amendment law as developed in the prison and school contexts
is not directly applicable to the mental hospital situation despite the similarities
of all three institutions as "total institutions." See GOFFMAN, supra note 3.
The security requirements of prisons are much greater than those of hos-
pitals; the need to prevent the introduction of weapons, tools and other contra-
band is recognized by the courts. Compare United States v. Marin, 378 F.2d
472 (2d Cir. 1967) (search of inmates returned from escape); Cline v. United
States, 116 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1940) (search of inmate about to be transferred);
People v. Frazier, 262 Cal. App. 2d 630, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1968) (search of
cell revealing homosexual activity) with People v. Vasques, 275 N.Y.S.2d 14,
9 N.E.2d 758 (1966), in which the opening and search of two envelopes which
had been taken from an inmate were held to be unreasonable; although the
taking was a proper protection of security interests, the search of the envelopes'
contents went beyond that which was necessary to secure those interests.
In school locker search cases, the private areas of students are not invaded
as the mental patients' rooms are. Dormitory, as well as locker, searches have
typically involved criminal behavior, frequently with the police participating in or
initiating the search, often pursuant to a warrant. See, e.g., People v. Overton,
24 N.Y.2d 522, 249 N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969); State v. Stein,
203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1968), cert. den. 397 U.S. 947 (1970); In re Donald-
son, 269 Cal. App. 2d 599, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); Piazzola v. Watkins,
316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of
Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968). The searches in
these cases are quite different from the hospital's administrative searches for
items the possession of which is non-criminal. None of the cited school cases
even take note of Camara.
70. One psychiatrist at Paris State Hospital already follows this policy in
his unit with apparent success.
71. McCray v. Maryland, 10 CRiM. L. RpeR. 2132 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery
Co. Md. Nov. 11, 1971).
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4. Patients have a right to be present during any search.
5. Patients must be given a written list of all items confiscated.
REFUSAL OF TREATMENT
Description
Paris State Hospital official policy (although unwritten), ac-
cording to the assistant superintendent, is that medication is not
forcibly administered to (1) short-term civil court commitments
for evaluation prior to final court commitment for treatment, (2)
voluntary patients, and (3) persons whose religious beliefs pre-
clude medication. In explaining these classifications, the admin-
istrator indicated that a voluntary patient would be given a choice
between cooperative medication and leaving the institution; how-
ever, he claims, this situation "hasn't arisen." Also, religious ex-
pressions would be ignored if they were part of the "ideation" of
the patient's illness. The assistant superintendent expressed his
support for the general practice of enforced medication in these
terms: "We can't just sit by and let them be sick."
A patient describes the policy this way. If medication is re-
fused, "the goon squad forces you-a needle in the ass-and then
they put you in the seclusion room." Most of the staff acknowl-
edges that a patient's group or grounds privileges will be with-
held while medication is being refused, whether or not the medi-
cation is actually received by intramuscular injection ("I.M.").
There seems, however, to be some difference in practice among
the various wards regarding the use of seclusion in such cases.
One nurse denied that seclusion is ever used when medication is
refused while an aide in another unit freely discussed with me the
techniques for forced medication and subsequent seclusion.
A psychiatrist at Paris suggested that a nurse will often de-
cide sua sponte to medicate a patient involuntarily even in cases
where the doctor would forego the medication if presented with
the opportunity to choose. Confronted with medical records or-
dering medication, the nurse's perceived obligation is to enforce
the "sacred" word of the doctor and the patient's willingness to
receive such medication is simply ignored.
A nurse on one ward uses an approach more thoughtful than
summary coercion. She first attempts to discuss the refusal with
the patient:
I point out the benefits. "You're here for a reason and if
you don't take your medicine you won't get well. This is one
of the reasons you're here." Most of the time they do take it.
Now if they absolutely refuse and there's no way they will
take it, I have to point out to them that if they don't take
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their medicine by mouth, then I'll have to get an order for
an injectable medicine. And then, 80% of the time, they
take it orally and maybe 20% have to be given injections.
It's usually once or twice [in their hospitalization that] they
refuse.
It is probably a fear of the "goon squad" and other sanctions
rather than any recognition of the medical benefit which limits
medication refusals to "once or twice" in a patient's hospital ca-
reer. Another factor might be the effect of the medication itself;
as one doctor, drawing on the catchwords of his trade, pointed
out to me, some medications are "miracles" and some are simply
"chemical restraints."
The assistant superintendent was able to state that the situa-
tion in which a voluntary patient refused medication and was of-
fered an opportunity to leave "hasn't arisen" because this pur-
ported policy just doesn't exist at the staff-patient interface. None
of the nurses, aides or treating psychiatrists made any distinction
between voluntary and involuntary patients in terms of decisions
to invoke sanctions for refusal of medication.
In one open ward individual choice is recognized, appar-
ently without interfering with institutional efficiency. The psychi-
atrist in charge permits his patients to choose their medication
and to determine when they go "on" or "off" it. If a patient re-
fuses, this doctor explains, "I don't give it to them. And then,
when they get unhappy, I say, 'Let's try it my way.'"
Discussion
Patients often complain that the direct or side effects of most
of the commonly used psychopharmaceuticals leave them in a
daze, slow their thought processes, create confusion and engender
apathy.72 Unpleasant or unexpected physical disturbances also
may accompany certain medications. 73  These problems are com-
pounded by the fact that patients are told little, if anything, about
the effect of the drugs they take (except that it will make them
"feel better") and often the drug's name is kept secret from them.
72. See generally, GOODMAN & GILLMAN, THE PHARMECOLOGICAL BASIS OF
THERAPEUTICS (4th ed. 1970). The general effects of the commonly used
phenothiazine drug Thorazine have been summarized as follows:
In short, the patient is no longer interested in himself, others, or the
situation in which he finds himself; he becomes quite calm and easy
to manage. With repeated administration, the patient slowly begins
to appear less drugged but remains generally unconcerned, unquestion-
ing and much easier to manage.
Mental Patient Civil Liberties Project, Patients' Drug Manual 3 (unpublished
working draft, 1972) (on file with the author).
73. See generally authorities cited note 72 supra.
[Vol. 13
IN-HOSPITAL CIVIL LIBERTIES
For many reasons, therefore, patients may justifiably decide that
they prefer not to receive prescribed medication.
The right to refuse treatment is based upon both the tradi-
tional legal concept of informed consent and upon fundamental
constitutional protections.
Informed Consent
An individual's right to physical and psychical integrity is
a well-defined legal74 and philosophical 7 concept. More than
eighty years ago, the United States Supreme Court declared:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley,
"The right to one's person may be said to be a right of com-
plete immunity: to be let alone."76
In general, there is no legal obstacle to a person's decision to
live with great pain or shorten his or her life or even to die" rather
than to submit to a physician's recommendations for proper med-
ical treatment.78  The law has consistently recognized the control
74. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960) Stack
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 177 Mass. 155, 157, 58 N.E. 686, 687 (1900)
("The common law was very slow to sanction any violation of or interference
with the person of a free citizen."); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); Note, Experimentation on Human Beings, 20
STAN. L. REV. 99 (1967).
75. I. BERLIN, Two CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY (1958):
[T]here ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom
which must on no account be violated, for if it is overstepped, the
individual will find himself in an area too narrow even that minimum
development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to
pursue, and even to conceive, the various ends which men hold good
or right or sacred. It follows that a frontier must be drawn between
the area of private life and that of public authority. Where it is to be
drawn is a matter of argument, indeed of haggling.
76. Union Pacific Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
77. See, e.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 32 11. 2d 361 (1965). There are
some cases in which non-consensual life-saving medical treatment has been per-
mitted. In one of the most significant, Georgetown College was authorized to
perform a blood transfusion in its hospital on an objecting Jehovah's Witness.
The patient was "in extremis and hardly compos mentis" and those two factors
(together with the non-protesting attitude of the patient's husband) justified the
decision of the court to intervene. Application of Georgetown College, 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. den. sub. nom., Jones v. Georgetown College, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
In the mental hospital, it is rarely, if ever, a matter of such life-or-death
urgency that medication be consumed. Even in the rare case, there may be
less restrictive and oppressive alternatives available. See note 49, supra.
78. A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment
is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or
deception. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. at 404, 350 P.2d at 1104.
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of a patient over his or her body; indeed, doctors have long been
held liable for the least touching without "informed consent.179
Aside from asserted concerns for the "best interests" of the
patient80 and for administrative quietude, the hospitals' justifica-
tions for forced medication are that (1) patients, unless medicated,
may be dangerous to themselves or others and (2) hospitalized
mental patients are incompetent to refuse consent. As discussed
earlier,8 most patients are not suicidal or assaultive and, for those
few who are, a less restrictive alternative than forced medication
should be sought. With reference to incompetency, even "from
a medical viewpoint, there is no necessary relationship between
commitability and incompetency. ' '8 2  The trend in recent years
among legislatures has been toward complete separation of hos-
pitalization and incompetency; it has been recognized that their
merger may needlessly deprive persons of essential personal
rights.8 3
There have been a number of cases in which the doctrine of
informed consent has explicitly been applied to the mental hos-
pital situation. Mitchell v. Robinson8 4 concerned a malpractice
action for convulsive fractures suffered while under insulin ther-
apy. The plaintiff was a diagnosed schizophrenic who, on rec-
ommendation of his physicians, underwent "combined electro-
shock and insulin subcoma therapy."85  The issue in the case, as
stated by the court, was "whether in the circumstances of this rec-
ord the doctors were under a duty to inform their patient of the
hazards of the treatment, leaving to the patient the option of liv-
ing with his illness or of taking the treatment and accepting its
hazards. '8'  The court held there was a duty to inform the mental
patient. 7
Lester v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."' upheld the validity
of a wife's consent to electroshock therapy administered to her
husband. Although the hushand agreed to the treatment, there
was apparently some fear on the part of the hospital and the wife
that if he were told of the hazards in great detail the result might
79. See note 74, supra. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 18 (4th ed., 1971).
80. See notes 11 and 16, supra.
81. See notes 56 and 57, supra.
82. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 196 (1952).
83. BRAKEL & ROCK, note 10, supra at 250-265.
84. 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 15.
87. See Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478 (Ky. 1964) (trial court
properly presumed that the mental patient had consented to treatments to
which she voluntarily submitted).
88. 240 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1957).
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be catastrophic to his personality. The court made it quite clear
that the psychiatrist is not exempt from the
well settled principles that a physician must, except in real
and serious emergencies, acquaint the patient, or, when the
circumstances require it, some one properly acting for him,
of the diagnosis and the treatment proposed, and obtain
consent thereto, express or implied, and, consent obtained
must proceed in accordance with proper reasonable medical
standards and in the exercise of due care.89
The informed consent cases, both in the general medical field
and in the mental health law area, support the principle that
mental patients must be given the opportunity to consider and
make a knowledgeable decision before psychiatric treatment is
administered."0 Without such opportunity and subsequent con-
sent, the patient has a right to refuse treatment.
Constitutional Rights
A mental patient involuntarily subjected to treatment has
been denied his or her constitutional right to be free from inva-
sion of privacy and from interference with freedom of thought and
sensation. 91
89. Id. at 679.
90. This principle applies primarily to the so-called "organic therapies"
which can change the patient's behavior without his or her cooperation. Such
therapies include medication, electroshock therapy, brain surgery and aversive
conditioning. For an analysis of these therapies see Note, Conditioning and
Other Techniques Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners
and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616 (1972). See also Katz, The Right to
Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 755, 776-77
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz]:
Within these therapeutic approaches two models of therapy can be dis-
tinguished: the psychotherapeutic and the organic. While both models
share the possibility of being employed in the service of social control
and subversion of a patient's way of life, the patient can resist the im-
pact of such applications in psychotherapy to a considerable extent, or
even completely, especially if he wishes to do so. If, in addition,
any psychotherapy that includes covert but deliberate manipulations
of human behavior is proscribed, the opportunity for unilateral attempts
at social control or uninvited subversion is further reduced. Psycho-
therapeutic techniques, to be successful, require the cooperation of the
patient though the nature and quality of this cooperation is not pre-
cisely known. The organic therapies, on the other hand, can bring
about changes, even radical changes, in a patient's behavior without
his cooperation. They can make him docile and agreeable to subse-
quent interventions that are at least in part the result of the effects by
chemical or physical agents. They can cause alterations in behavior
that are reversible and irreversible. However, the crucial distinction
between the two models is that "therapeutic benefits" or "therapeutic
harm" can be conferred in the psychotherapeutic model only with the
collaboration of the patient and, in the organic model, even in its ab-
sence (Footnotes omitted).
91. For a discussion of this approach in another context see Bowers, Prison-
ers' Rights in Prison Medical Experimentation Programs, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE
REVIEW 319 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bowers]. See also A. Taylor, The
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These rights were the basis for the decision in Stanley v.
Georgia,"2 which held that private possession of obscene material
cannot constitutionally be made a crime. In that case, the indi-
vidual asserted "the right to read or observe what he pleases-
the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the
privacy of his own home.""3  The Supreme Court held this per-
sonal sphere inviolable: "Our whole constitutional heritage rebels
at the thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds.""4 Just as the Court rejected Georgia's assertion of a right
to "control the moral content of a person's thoughts,"9 so ought
the asserted right to control the "saneness" of a person's thoughts
be rejected. 0
Huguez v. United States97 involved a border search for nar-
cotics. The "intrusive body cavity invasion," as the court de-
scribed it, (the drugs were hidden in the man's rectum) necessi-
tated a forcible medical examination with government agents
keeping the subject against the examination table. This "force
process" caused, as might be expected, "considerable discomfort
and pain."9" The Ninth Circuit weighed the problems of law
enforcement against the "individual's right to human dignity and
privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment"9 and found that
the Government had gone too far. The court observed: 100
Nor are the intimate internal areas of the physical habitation
of mind and soul any less deserving of precious preserva-
tion from unwarranted and forcible intrusions than are the
intimate internal areas of the wife and family. Is not the
Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment (unpublished 1973) (on file
with the author).
92. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
93. Id. at 565.
94. Id. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) for a fuller
exposition of the right to privacy. See also Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
95. 394 U.S. at 565.96. See generally N. KrrTIE, THE RGrrr To BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE
AND ENFORCED THERAPY (1971). Equally important to the patient is the rightto observe, feel and think without the deadening interference of mind-affecting
medication.
This right to refuse treatment would probably not extend to medication forbrief periods in emergency situations where actual dangerousness is established.Cf. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wise. 1972) (civil commit-
ment standardof "dangerousness" required); In re Williams, 157 F. Supp. 871(D.D.C. 1958), a! 'd, 252 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (mere showing of poten-
tial dangerousness doesn't warrant involuntary commitment). But even in the
emergency situation, there are grounds for "conscientious objection" to treat-
ment. See notes 106 and 107 infra.
97. 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968).
98. Id. at 373.
99. Id. at 376, quoting with approval Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d
805, 808 (9th Cir. 1957).
100. 406 F.2d at 382, n.84.
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sanctity of the body even more important, and therefore,
more to be honored in its protection than the sanctity of the
home. ..?
This reasoning applies with equal or greater force in the mental
hospital where the patient has committed no crime and where the
forcible intrusion of treatment is a continuous, rather than a one-
time, occurrence.
An earlier Ninth Circuit case, York v. Story,'' held that the
actions of state officers in photographing the nude body of a fe-
male complainant constituted "an arbitrary invasion upon the se-
curity of one's privacy in this Due Process sense."' 02 The court
said that "we cannot conceive of a more basic subject of privacy
than the naked body."'' There is no reasonable alternative but
to support the conclusion of one commentator on these cases that
"it would be inconsistent and illogical to find that photographing
and viewing the naked body constitutes an unconstitutional inva-
sion of privacy, but that the far greater intrusion of injecting a
potent chemical agent does not."'1 4
A right to refuse medication on first amendment religious
grounds was upheld in Winters v. Miller,'"' in which a New York
state mental institution administered treatment to a Christian Sci-
entist against her religious beliefs. It was held that absent a find-
ing of special incompetence (a finding of "mental illness" did not
raise even a presumption of incompetency or inability to manage
one's affairs), the mental patient retains the right to sue or defend
in his or her own name, to sell or dispose of property, to marry,
draft a will, in general to manage his or her own affairs, and, in
the case at bar, to refuse medication on first amendment grounds.
Based on the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Seeger'06 that it was unconstitutional to restrict recognition of con-
scientious objection to military service to persons professing only
traditional religious beliefs, the Winters case may properly be ex-
tended to those mental patients who are in a very real sense "con-
scientious objectors," and whose opposition to medication is as
sincerely and deeply felt as that of Ms. Winters.
0 7
101. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
102. Id. at 455.
103. Id.
104. Bowers, supra note 91 at 329.
105. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
106. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The Court declared that "[t]he test [for con-
scientious objection] might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within
the statutory definition." Id. at 176. "In such a personal area, of course,"
the Court explained, "the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential
part of a religious faith must be given great weight." Id. at 184.
107. Conscientious objection was extended to persons with purely moral
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As implied by the court in Winters v. Miller, there may be
a procedural due process requirement which must be met before
a mental hospital can impose medication even on an incompetent
patient:
While it may be true that the state would validly undertake
to treat Miss Winters if it did stand in a parens patriae rela-
tionship to her and such a relationship might be created if
and when a person is found legally incompetent, there was
never any effort on the part of the appellees to secure such ajudicial determination of incompetency before proceeding
to treat Miss Winters in the way they thought would be
"best" for her . . . . Under our Constitution there is no
procedural right more fundamental than the right of the citi-
zen, except in exceptional circumstances, to tell his side
of the story to an impartial tribunal.108
In cases involving medical or mental treatment the United States
Supreme Court has required procedural protection"'0 against the
"grievous loss"1'O similar to that of imposed institutional psychiatric
therapy.
A recent commentator supports my conclusion that there
must be some limits imposed on the broad authority now exer-
cised by the psychiatric profession in treating persons who are
mental patients:
In the context of a right or duty to be treated, the presently
unrestricted option to impose any treatment, particularly ex-
perimental procedures, therapeutic techniques with uncer-
tain predictive consequences, and treatments which aim for
social control, can no longer be left to the sole discretion of
the mental health profession."'
and ethical convictions in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The
reasoning of Welsh and Seeger suggests that it would be unconstitutional to
discriminate in favor of persons such as Ms. Winters whose objection to treat-
ment was based on a traditional religious belief; patients with moral or ethical
scruples against organic therapies may not be compelled to violate their con-
sciences. See L. Curry, The Right to Refuse Psychiatric Treatment in Prison,
1972 (unpublished work) (on file with the author).
108. 446 F.2d at 71.
109. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 326
U.S. 535, 543 (1942) (Stone, J. concurring opinion). This procedural protec-
tion is required when "a new finding of fact," 386 U.S. at 608, is involved.
In the mental hospital, the new findings of fact involved (whether for a patient
involuntarily committed as "mentally ill" or for a voluntary patient) is whether
that person is incompetent to refuse to consent to treatment.
110. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951):
The Court is not alone in recognizing that the right to be heard beforebeing condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind even though it
may not involve the stigma and hardship of a criminal conviction, is a
principle basic to our society.




1. Patients must always be informed on their diagnosis and
treatment plans, as well as the nature of their medication and
the hazards involved.
2. If there are alternative modes of treatment available, the pa-
tient, after consultation with the psychiatrist, must make the ul-
timate choice.
3. In general, the mental hospital may not force treatment upon
an objecting patient. The only exceptions to this are the emer-
gency situation where there is no less restrictive alternative and
the case where a court has ordered a particular mode of treat-
ment.
4. "Conscientious objection" to psychiatric treatment should be
recognized.
5. For appropriate cases, a due process procedural mechanism
must be utilized to determine incompetence to refuse in those ju-




Many state hospitals in the United States have farms, dairies,
laundries or industries which employ (typically without pay) their
patients.112 Paris State Hospital does not have such facilities and
thus patient labor is confined largely to personal and ward house-
keeping tasks, and to work through the Vocational Adjustment
Service, the hospital department which is the equivalent of "in-
dustrial therapy."
Patients are referred to the Vocational Adjustment Service
(V.A.S.) by their doctors not long after admission; the V.A.S.
staff make the particular work assignment within its program.
No patient receives regular payment for his or her work although
some receive compensation for particular bits of work at irregu-
lar rates and intervals. A majority of Paris patients work at least
five hours per day at their V.A.S. assignments performing such
functions as dishwashing, sewing, furniture repair and refinishing,
delivery of mail and messages, canteen food sales, grounds main-
tenance and landscaping, car washing, secretarial duties and gen-
eral janitorial work. If work is performed for the benefit of the
112. For a general discussion of mental patient labor see F.L. Bartlett, Ex-
ploitative Work Programs in American State Hospitals 1971 (unpublished
paper); Bartlett, Present Day Requirements For State Hospitals Joining the
Community, 276 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 90 (1967); Bartlett,




hospital (for example, repair of outdoor wooden benches), the
patient will receive nothing; if, on the other hand, a staff member
or a private citizen brings an article to be repaired to V.A.S., the
patient theoretically receives 75% of any donation, the remaining
25% being placed in a general fund for patient activities. Not
surprisingly, most patients interviewed at Paris State Hospital have
never received a penny for such repair work and were unaware
of the 75-25 policy.
Patients must keep their own living area clean and neat. A
sign posted on one ward directs:
ALL PATIENTS WILL SWEEP THEIR ROOMS OUT AND
PUT THEIR CLOTHES AWAY EVERY MORNING
In addition, patients perform what are called "ward assignments"
on their particular unit. A large permanent chart is typically dis-
played behind the nursing station window with every patient's
name affixed to movable stickers and assigned to an item of work.
The jobs are rotated periodically. The following excerpt is a
partial list of the chart (including verbatim job descriptions) on
one locked ward:
WARD ASSIGNMENTS
Dayroom-wet cloth, furniture and clear ashtrays. Sweep
and dry mop.
Luxury and Linen Closet-straighten up and wet mop.
Shower room--clean tub and shower and wet mop.
Kitchen-dry mop, sweep, clean cabinet.
Nurses' Station-empty waste cans, clean windows.
Janitor's room-straighten up pails and dry mop.
Bathroom-toilets, floor and walls.
Laundry room--clean sink and wet mop.
Main halls-dry mop/and sweep.
Piano room-wet mop, clean furniture.
Cross halls-dry mop, sweep.
The work is done after breakfast and, on the closed wards,
before the unit's door is unlocked for those with grounds priv-
ileges. Failure or refusal to perform will usually result in loss
of privileges for the day. A nurse explains, "If we have a lazy
patient that can do it, then there's some action to be taken. If a
patient is usually sloppy, then no action is taken."
The hospital staff places great emphasis on patient attitudes
and performance of assigned labor. A nurse noted on a patient's
hospital record, "Does ward assignments well under strict super-
vision." In staff discussions about release from seclusion or trans-
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fer to an open building, a patient's work record (both on the
ward and at his or her V.A.S. assignment) is usually one of the
bases for decision. One patient was told that she would not be
transferred out of a locked ward unless she agreed to become an
institutional mail carrier.
The general staff acceptance of the propriety of patient labor
is epitomized in the comment of one aide that "they know it's
their job and they do it." However, one hospital worker I spoke
with disagrees, at least in part; concerning the ward assignment
system, he said:
Institutional housekeeping should be a job. To the extent
patients do it, someone is not getting paid to do it-em-
ployees or patients.
Organized resistance to forced labor in mental hospitals is,
as might be expected in such total institutions, 113 quite rare. On
occasion, though, the collective energy for such a demonstration
is mobilized. One February morning, all the women on one of
the locked wards at Paris State Hospital sat down after breakfast
and refused to work. In characteristic response, the staff revoked
everyone's grounds privileges for that day and a doctor was called
in to "speak" to the patients.
Discussion
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion broadly prohibits involuntary servitude with only one excep-
tion:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. 114
When forced labor is exacted from patients in mental hospitals,
it seems most appropriate to call upon this historic amendment
for its protections. As the President's Committee on Civil Rights
stated in 1947,
Slavery was abolished in this country nearly a century ago,
and in its traditional form has disappeared. But the temp-
tation to force poor and defenseless persons, by one device or
another, into a condition of virtual slavery still exists ...
Where large numbers of people are frightened, uneducated,
113. See GOFFMAN, supra note 3.
114. On the thirteenth amendment generally, see tenBroek, Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171
(1951). Congress has exercised its implementing power under Section 2 of the
amendment by enacting civil and criminal sanctions. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1964)
provides a fine and imprisonment for anyone holding another in involuntary
servitude; any law, regulation or usage which maintains a system of peonage is
declared void by 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1964).
1973]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER [Vol. 13
and under privileged, the dangers of involuntary servitude re-
main.' 15
Whether the system is denominated "slavery," "peonage," or
"involuntary servitude,"'16 the courts have affirmed the absolute
nature of the right to be free from involuntary servitude. For
example, in Pollock v. Williams," 7 the United States Supreme
Court declared that the "undoubted aim of the thirteenth amend-
ment . . . was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a sys-
tem of completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United
States.""'  Compulsion of work by threats, fears or coercion may,
in particular circumstances, be violative of the amendment's com-
mand. 119
An early case involving forced labor of mental patients is
Stone v. City of Paducah,20 decided in 1905. There, the court
held that a city ordinance which attempted to require labor of
"idiots, insane persons, and inebriates" during confinement in city
jails, enroute to asylums, was unconstitutional:
115. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RGHTs
29-30 (1947).
116. Slavery has been described as "the state of entire subjection of one per-
son to the will of another," while involuntary servitude encompasses forced serv-
ice of one person to another. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1905). Peonage requires an element of indebtedness. See Bailey v. Ala-
bama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
117. 322 U.S. 4 (1944).
118. Id. at 17. See also Anderson v. Ellington, 300 F. Supp. 789 (M.D.
Tenn. 1969) (three-judge court held unconstitutional statute authorizing im-
prisonment as a means of recovering costs against criminal defendants); Wright
v. Matthews, 209 Va. 246, 163 S.E.2d 158 (1968).
119. In United States v. Shackney, 333 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964), a Connec-
ticut chicken farmer had imported a Mexican family to work on his farm.
The government charged that 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (1964) (involuntary servitude)
had been violated in that the defendant had used force by psychological and
economic intimidation and coercion. The appellate court reversed the convic-
tion because it found, after a review of the evidence, no basis for deciding
that the statute was "satisfied by a threat to have the employee sent back to the
country of his origin, at least absent circumstances which would make such
deportation equivalent to imprisonment or worse." Id. at 486. The court de-
fined involuntary servitude as "action by the master causing the servant to
have, or to believe he has, no way to avoid continued service or confinement."
Id. at 486. See also Bernal v. United States, 241 F. 339 (5th Cir. 1917)
(threats to turn victim over to immigration authorities unless debt was worked
off); In re Peonage Charge, 138 F. 686 (N.D. Fla. 1905) (physical force and
capture); Davis v. United States, 12 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1926), cert. den., 271
U.S. 688 (1926) (employee physically restrained by guards); Pierce v. United
States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. den., 324 U.S. 873 (1945) (fear of
return to prison and physical violence). Because of the nature of mental hos-
pitalization, psychological coercion to work involuntarily is ever-present; in addi-
tion to fearing withdrawal of precious privileges, patients justifiably believe that
cooperative work habits will convince hospital personnel that the patient is a
"good patient" and may properly be released. Noncooperation with work
means prolonged confinement in the hospital.
120. 120 Ky. 322, 86 S.W. 531 (1905).
IN-HOSPITAL CIVIL LIBERTIES
And as these persons are in jail not because of their con-
viction of any offense, they cannot be compelled to labor,
for such would be involuntary servitude, and in violation of
section 25 of the state Constitution and the thirteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States.
121
In four federal cases,1 22 all brought by inmates of the Medi-
cal Center for Federal Prisoners in Missouri, the courts ruled with-
out qualification that the thirteenth amendment prohibited any
involuntary work by the patients; any possible therapeutic value
of the labor was not discussed as constitutionally relevant. Each
of the four petitioners had been charged but not convicted of a
crime and each, having been found incompetent to stand trial, had
been committed for psychiatric treatment. If these persons are
protected absolutely by the thirteenth amendment, then, a forti-
ori, mental patients who have not been convicted of a crime may
not be forced to labor involuntarily.
Other approaches to the problem-less direct and absolute
than the thirteenth amendment argument urged above-have been
utilized by the courts. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Jobson v. Henne,12a held that the plaintiff
mental patient had stated a federal cause of action when he al-
leged that he was required to work in the hospital boiler house
and at assigned jobs in a local village. The court "assumed"
that the thirteenth amendment does not foreclose the states
from requiring that a lawfully committed inmate perform
121. Id. at 323, 86 S.W. at 533.
122. The first case, Tyler v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964)
was a habeas corpus petition in which the patient claimed that he was required
to perform "a non-essential clerical function." Id. at 853. The court held that
the claim stated a cause of action under the thirteenth amendment and di-
rected the hospital to file a response.
In Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1966), the court
ruled that "if petitioner is being forced to work at the Medical Center, his
constitutional rights are being violated," and ordered the hospital to show
cause why his petition should not be granted. Id. at 556.
Two years later, the court reported, in the third case, that the Medical
Center "not only acknowledges that it does not have the right to have uncon-
victed inmates perform work unless the inmate wishes to do so, but also that
the Medical Center advises each inmate within a few days of his arrival that if
he is an unconvicted person he has the right not to work." Parks v. Ciccone,
281 F. Supp. 805, 811 (W.D. Mo. 1968) (emphasis added). The petitioner's
claim was denied since patients who did not work were not "discriminated
against" and the petitioner was "free to cease working any time he wishes with-
out being punished for so doing." Id. at 811.
In Henry v. Ciccone, 315 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. Mo. 1970), the court de-
nied a forced labor claim after it found that the patient knowingly and freely
signed a form which "fully informed him of his right not to work;" the court
further found that patients "who do not sign the waiver are permitted all
normal privileges and no punitive action is taken against them . . . and that the
work assignment form is not ... binding." Id. at 891.
123. 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
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without compensation certain chores designed to reduce
the financial burden placed on a state by its program of treat-
ment for the mentally retarded, if the chores are reasonably
related to a therapeutic program, or if not directly so related,
chores of a normal housekeeping type and kind.' 2 4
The Jobson court held, however, that some programs might
be so "ruthless" in character that the court could properly con-
clude that the inmate had been subjected to involuntary servi-
tude. 125  Wyatt v. Stickney, 26 apparently following the "assump-
tion" in the Jobson case, permitted the hospital to require thera-
peutic labor which does not involve the operation and mainte-
nance of the institution if such activity is part of the patient's
treatment plan and is properly supervised. Other labor, thera-
peutic or not, may be performed only if compensated in accord-
ance with the Fair Labor Standards Act and if the patient en-
gages in such labor voluntarily. 27
124. Id. at 131.
125. Id. at 132.
126. See note 5, supra.
127. The iWyatt standards on patient labor provide:
a. Institution Maintenance
(1) No resident shall be required to perform labor which involves
the operation and maintenance of the institution or for which the
institution is under contract with an outside organization. Privi-
leges or release from the institution shall not be conditioned upon
the performance of labor covered by this provision. Residents may
voluntarily engage in such labor if the labor is compensated in
accordance with the minimum wage laws of the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended, 1966.(2) No resident shall be involved in the care (feeding, clothing,
bathing), training, or supervision of other residents unless he:(a) has volunteered;(b) has been specifically trained in the necessary skills;(c) has the humane judgment required for such activities;(d) is adequately supervised; and(e) is reimbursed in accordance with the minimum wage laws
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended,
1966.
b. Training Tasks and Labor
(1) Residents may be required to perform vocational training
tasks which do not involve the operation and maintenance of theinstitution, subject to a presumption that an assignment of longer
than three months to any task is not a training task, provided the
specific task or any change in task assignment is:(a) An integrated part of the resident's habilitation plan and
approved as a habilitation activity by a Qualified Mental Re-
tardation Professional responsible for supervising the resident's
habilitation;(b) Supervised by a staff member to oversee the habilitation
aspects of the activity.(2) Residents may voluntarily engage in habilitative labor at non-
program hours for which the institution would otherwise have to
pay an employee, provided the specific labor or any change in labor
is: (a) An integrated part of the resident's habilitation plan and
approved as a habilitation activity by a Qualified Mental Re-
tardation Professional responsible for supervising the resident's
habilitation;
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Persons who are patients in mental hospitals require the pro-
tection of the thirteenth amendment at least as much as history's
slaves and more than persons accepted as healthy. Unless re-
stricted by this constitutional imperative, psychiatrists will be able
to continue to ascribe to their patients the modern equivalent of
a disease described in 1851 as peculiar to the Negro race, dys-
aethesia Aethiopis-a slave's behavior in neglecting his work.
128
Recommendations
1. No forced labor of mental patients should be permitted.
2. All labor (with the exception of personal housekeeping tasks)
should be voluntary and compensated in accordance with the
minimum wage laws of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
SECLUSION AND RESTRAINTS
Seclusion
On the top floor of the locked building at Paris State Hos-
pital are two seclusion areas each containing five seclusion rooms.
Entering the area through the locked door from the ward's hall-
way, one finds three rooms (behind locked doors) on the left and
two locked rooms plus a separate toilet and shower arrangement
on the right. There are no doors on the toilet or shower stalls.
During my visits to seclusion in the winter, the temperature in
the area always seemed cooler than that on the rest of the ward.
The seclusion rooms are not large (about four paces by three
paces) and contain nothing but a thin mat about thirty inches
wide which lies on the tiled floor. The walls are also tiled.
These large seclusion areas are used, one nurse told me, for
"problems of agitation which are really management problems."
Each ward on the other floors of the locked building has a single
seclusion room similar to the ones on the top floor. With refer-
ence to this "local" seclusion, an aide said that not only is this
room used for "problem" patients but it is "actually a room that
can be used to sleep a person" or for a "geriatric patient who's
roaming around."
Official, hospital policy for "Nursing Care of the Hyperactive,
(b) Supervised by a staff member to oversee the habilitation
aspects of the activity; and
(c) Compensated in accordance with the minimum wage laws
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 as amended,
1966.
344 F. Supp. 387, at 402.
128. Szasz, The Sane Slave: An Historical Note on the Use of Medical
Diagnosis as Justificatory Rhetoric, 25 AM. J. PsYcHoTHERAPY 228 (1971),
citcd in Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REv. 295 (1972).
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Aggressive, Hostile and Assaultive Patient" is contained in a sec-
tion of the Nursing Manual with that title.'29 Two plans are de-
scribed,' the first of which, "Plan I-Communication and
Techniques," provides that when a patient's behavior becomes
"unacceptable," the staff should first take the patient to an area
which provides "less stimuli." This area does not have to be the
seclusion room but may be, for example, "the music room, vis-
itors' room or patient's bedroom." If Plan I fails, then "Plan II
-The Quiet Room" is implemented and the patient is placed in






I. Observe any precipitating factors involved in patient's unacceptable
behavior.
A. List these factors on the Kardex.
B. Plan for meeting the patient's needs.
II. Handle the Outburst:
A. Take the patient to an area that provides less stimuli.
POINT TO REMEMBER:
* * * This area of "less stimuli" does not have to be the seclu-
sion room but can be the music room, visitor's room, or pa-
tient's bedroom. * * *
B. Encourage the patient to act out and provide means to do so.(Proper handling of the patient at this time will often forestall or
do away with the need for seclusion for this incident.)
C. Offer the patient medication if indicated and ordered.
Plan II-The Quiet Room
I. Purpose: To protect the overactive patient from injuring himself,
other patients or personnel. The quiet room lessens stimuli, offers
control to the patient who has lost control, protects patients from each
other, and permits freedom of movement for the overactive individual.
Seclusion is justified on therapeutic rational grounds, but only if it is
used sparingly, for selected patients, and only for brief periods.
IL Procedure:
1. Explain the reason for the Quiet Room to the patient and reassure
him.
POINT TO REMEMBER:
If prompt action is required, the explanation may be given to the
patient as you act, but under no condition or circumstance is it
ethical or polite to omit it.
2. Escort the patient to the Quiet Room.
3. Select the properly appointed Quiet Room.
4. Allow for appropriate attire of the patient.
5. Notify the physician in charge of the patient immediately. If at
night, the night resident is to be notified and must see the patient.
POINT TO REMEMEBER:
Any patient in the Quiet Room for more than 8 hours must be
seen by the physician.
6. In an acute emergency, the patient may be placed in the Quiet
Room and an order from the doctor obtained later.
7. Visit the patient every 15 minutes. ...
8. Record:
a)* * *
b) Complete form HSH-32N (Seclusion Order) at the end of every
8-hour tour of duty. ...
c) Chart any known precipitating factors, therapeutic interaction
and resulting behavior which necessitated the use of the quiet room
as well as the patient's behavior during his stay in the Quiet
Room on Nurses Notes. . ..
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seclusion. This policy requires that the patient be told the rea-
sons for seclusion because "under no condition or circumstance
is it ethical or polite to omit it."
It is clearly intended that, in dealing with the "hyperactive"
patient, the procedures of Plan I should be utilized in most situa-
tions and that seclusion should be used only in those rare cases
where it is necessary to protect the patient or others from actual
physical injury. "We use it as a last resort for the protection of
self and others" is how one nurse summarized the hospital policy.
131
Another nurse's conception of proper grounds for seclusion,
however, was stated this way:
Just for physical assault or someone who is upsetting the
entire unit, like screaming up and down the hallways, banging
the doors, really upsetting everybody.
Such seclusion for "upsetting" behavior is but a mild indication
of the discretionary stretching of official policy which goes on
daily at Paris. Plan II requires a record of "any known precipi-
tating factors, therapeutic interaction and resulting behavior"
which necessitates seclusion. Listed below are the full nurse's
notes recorded verbatim which purport to be these required rec-
ords. Three separate instances of seclusion are involved:




The third situation of the "verbally hostile" patient is par-
ticularly significant in the light of the protection justification offi-
cially invoked by the staff. Either this patient was being pun-
ished for mere verbalisms or the staff just wanted some quiet.
In all three cases, there is no indication in the record of what
aspects, if any, of Plan I were employed or whether any attempt
was made to use a less restrictive alternative such as placing the
patient in his or her bedroom.
As the above incidents and those noted below indicate, se-
clusion seems to be the first resort, rather than the last. Some
exceptional personnel will take the time to forestall the need for
seclusion by following the personal communication policies out-
lined in the Manual;132 a psychiatrist at Paris State Hospital noted
that the policies embodied by Plan I are sound and "many agi-
131. In addition, a patient, fearful of other patients or feeling a personal
need, may request to be secluded. This request would be granted. For exam-
ple, a nurse noted on the medical record of a patient who had been in seclusion,
"since pt was in on request he was released on same."
132. Plan II (II)(8)(c), Nursing Manual, supra note 129.
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tated patients will settle down if you talk to them." Most staff,
unfortunately, are too ready-some are even anxious--to lock the
patient up. An experienced professional observer declared that,in many particular cases he has seen, "they practically goad the
patient into fucking up."
The hospital's seclusion order dictates that "seclusion is to
be employed only on the signed order of a physician.
Paris policy apparently assumes that the physicians are making,
or at least, carefully and immediately reviewing, all seclusion de-
cisions. They are not. "Nurses really have more to do with who
goes into seclusion" than the doctors, a hospital psychiatrist told
me. A nurse said simply, "You don't have to call the doctor all
the time." Similarly, nurses often obtain permission to seclude
"p.r.n." (as is necessary). Although these p.r.n. orders are con-
trary to hospital policy, they are given frequently and provide
nurses with unfettered latitude regarding the decision to seclude.
Even when the nurse does decide to obtain a doctor's per-
mission to seclude, similar problems arise. Most of the time(4:30 P.M. until 8 A.M. plus all weekend), the patient's owndoctor is not at the hospital. The doctor on duty, of course, is
not familiar with the patient and more than likely will approve
whatever is recommended by the nurse. On one occasion, Dr.
Hendrickson, on weekend duty, received a phone call from a nurse
who wished to seclude a young patient who was attacking an older
man. Assuming the patient would be secluded for a few hours
until he quieted down, the doctor gave his verbal assent. The
next day, Dr. Hendrickson, curious about the outcome of the
night's incident, went to the ward to visit the patient and found
written on the medical chart, "Place in seclusion until seen byhis doctor" signed by the nurse as a verbal order ("v.o.") from
Dr. Hendrickson. The quoted order had not been given; it would
have meant seclusion for the patient two or three days although
even a signed order applies only for a maximum of twenty-four
hours.
The combined effect of the discretionary and p.r.n. aspects
of seclusion result in interactions such as this: A patient, Joel
Marson, about forty years old, had spent the afternoon laughing
intermittently; a great part of his amusement, it seemed to me,
focused on the spectacle of my walking around the locked ward
with my yellow pad taking notes and copying notices from thebulletin board. At one point, writing at the desk in the nursing
133. Paris State Hospital, Form HSH-32N (1965) (on file with the au-thor). In an emergency, the staff may take immediate action but contact withthe doctor must be made as soon as the emergency is over.
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station, I looked up and there, three feet away on the other side
of the glass, sat Mr. Marson smiling and staring at me. He began
to laugh again. An aide soon spoke to the nurse suggesting that
before the doctor left the floor, "it might be a good idea to get
a p.r.n. to put him in seclusion." The nurse shook her head from
side to side and replied, "That's O.K., we can put him in."
As the discussion thus far has implied, grounds for seclusion
(as for revocation of privileges) are not prescribed with the clar-
ity that would give a patient notice of the sanctions to be applied
for particular misbehavior. Striking a staff member or another
patient does not always result in seclusion. Simple "agitation"
(for example, over revocation of grounds privileges), including
yelling and overturning trash cans, merited seclusion in one case
while assaulting a person and cutting his arm went "untreated" in
another instance.
Important for the perspective it provides on staff attitudes
toward seclusion is this conversation among a psychiatrist, nurse
and aide. The nurse and aide were attempting to convince the
doctor not to release a patient who was then in seclusion.
Nurse: "I feel very uncomfortable. I don't think he'll jump
anyone but I think he should stay in seclusion. I told him
he'd be back there for a while, that he knew what he'd done
was wrong."
The psychiatrist suggested that the patient be released and
told that if he became assaultive in the next few weeks, he
would be secluded or have privileges (e.g., the patient was
scheduled to return to his outside job) taken away.
Aide: "I don't think it's fair (to let him out). I spent so
much time with him yesterday. I talked to him. Miss Mil-
ler talked to him for an hour. I don't think he should be
allowed to do what he did."
The doctor listed all the privileges which could be with-
drawn and said: "That would disturb him."
Nurse: "I don't think taking away his privileges is any pun-
ishment for him . .. ."
Aide: "Miss Gentowsky was walking him down the hall to
take him back into seclusion. He thought at first she was tak-
ing him down the hall to talk with him about what he had
done and when he realized he was being put into seclusion
again, he struck her."
Restraints
The state mental health statute forbids the use of mechanical
restraints with the hospital except when it is "determined that
such are required by the medical needs of such person admitted
or committed." Paris' restraint order form requires the signature
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of a physician and defines mechanical restraints as "the use of
camisoles, or the use of sheets or towels for restricting the patient
to his chair or bed." It continues, "In applying apparatus for re-
straint none other than those mentioned are permitted."' 4
Restraints are used infrequently at Paris State Hospital.
There are only two sets of them for the entire locked building.
It is rare, I was told by an aide, that they would be used upon a
patient in seclusion; usually they are applied in the open area
near the nursing station where the patient can be watched. When
would a patient be restrained? "If a patient is unsteady on his
feet, the doctor might write a restraint order." How is restraint
accomplished? "With a little sheet, just a little sheet, tied around
the arms of the chair." These are the responses of a veteran staff
person.
Further observations cast considerable doubt on the imple-
mentation of the restraint order form and on the "little sheet"
characterization of the devices actually employed. The only time
I was restricted in my research at the hospital was the day when
I first asked to see the fifth floor seclusion area on the male side.
The nurse hesitated for a moment, said that there was a patient
in one of the rooms and that she had to call his doctor for permis-
sion for me to enter the area. An hour or so later I reminded
the nurse of my earlier request and was told that the doctor had
said that the sound of the main door opening might bother the
patient who, the nurse indicated, was very upset. The nurse took
me over to the female side of the building and showed me the
seclusion area there which also had a patient locked in one of the
rooms. For this visit, no doctor was consulted. A short time
after our return to the male side, an attendant came into the nurs-
ing station, his arms full of items he began placing into a box.
The box was about twenty-five inches long, a foot and a half wide
and five inches deep.
The box was labelled "restraints." Those I saw included a
white cotton or gauze gag about four inches wide and eight inches
long which ties behind the head, an apron-like garment which
holds one's arms at the sides, elbows pressed against one's waist,
leather straps about two feet long and an inch wide with buckles
at the end, shorter leather straps and objects which looked like
cuffs or collars with buckles. The conclusion to which I imme-
diately jumped was that these had been used on the patient for
whose sake I had not been permitted to enter the seclusion area.
I said to a female aide with whom I had been talking and to the
male who had, by then, finished packing the box, "I suppose
134. Paris State Hospital, Form HSH-32N (1965) (on file with the author).
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they're the restraints for the man who was in seclusion." They
both replied simultaneously. She said, "No." He said, "Yes."
Due Process135
Probably because confinement in seclusion or with restraints
is usually for relatively short periods of time, unlike confinement
in maximum security wards, there are no court decisions on this
aspect of mental health law. There are, however, a number of
cases involving the solitary confinement of prisoners which are
closely analogous to the situation of mental patients.
The courts regard the solitary confinement of prisoners as a
much more serious sanction than confinement in maximum se-
curity units. Thus, even the rare court which did not require any
kind of hearing before a prisoner was transferred to a more se-
cure penal institution did require a hearing before an inmate
could be subjected to a protracted segregated confinement. 130
That court held that minimal due process required notice of the
charges and a hearing before a relatively objective and impartial
tribunal. 3 7 While the conditions in seclusion in some mental hos-
pitals may not be as barbaric as those in prisons, such solitary
confinement is as great a deprivation of liberty as confinement
in a maximum security ward, a disposition which requires, inter
alia, the due process protections of an impartial decisionmaker,
notice, the opportunity to confront witnesses and a reviewable rec-
ord.
It should make absolutely no difference whether a patient is
placed in seclusion for violation of a hospital rule or for purported
medical treatment; the deprivation in either case is identical.3 8
In Davis v. Lindsay,13 1 the court held that confinement in a soli-
tary cell was unconstitutional even though the prisoner was ac-
corded "all the privileges granted to the remainder of the popula-
tion and, indeed, in some respects such as the size of her room
and the availability of a radio, the present arrangements are fa-
vorable to her."' 40  The Davis court found that there was a "fac-
tual, if not legal, penalty of solitude.' 4'
135. I am indebted to Leslie Price, Esq. for her assistance with this section
and the discussion below of transfers to maximum security.
136. Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
137. Id. at 171. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971)
required the same due process standard to be applied to solitary confinement as
to transfers to maximum security.
138. In Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court re-
fused to draw a distinction between prisoners placed in punitive segregation and
those placed in administrative segregation. Accord, Urbano v. McCorkle, 334
F. Supp. 161 (D. N.J. 1971).
139. 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
140. Id. at 1136.
141. Id. at 1138.
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There are numerous prisoners' rights cases in which courts
have defined the due process requirements for solitary confine-
ment. For example, in Sinclair v. Henderson,14 2 the court re-
quired that the "prisoner must be given official written notice of
the specific charge against him" and that, before a serious punish-
ment such as punitive segregation can be imposed, "the prisoner
must be given a hearing at which he shall have an opportunity to
be heard. The determination to impose the punishment should
be made by one other than the accusing guard."
Eighth Amendment
No matter what process is used, under some conditions, soli-
tary confinement or use of restraints in the mental hospital may
violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment to the United States Constitution. This would be
so despite the hospital's argument that the sanctions applied are
not intended to be punitive. 4 '
While no court has yet held that solitary confinement of
prisoners is per se a violation of the eighth amendment, there
have been numerous cases holding that certain conditions accom-
panying solitary confinement are cruel and unusual punishment.'
142. 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1139 (E.D. La. 1970). Compare Sostre v. McGin-
nis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Smoake v. Fritz, 320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Carter
v. McGinnis, 320 F. Supp. 1092 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) with Courtney v. Bishop, 409
F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1969) which, in a case involving a prison stabbing, upheld
solitary confinement.
143. See Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and Urbano
v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D. N.J. 1971) (requirement for hearing can't be
circumvented by labelling segregation "administrative" or stating that it is in the
interests of order).
144. See, e.g., Dearman v. Woodson, 429 F.2d 1288 (10th Cir. 1970) (over-
ruling lower court dismissal of complaint alleging denial of food for more than
50 hours); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967) (prisoner forced
to remain nude and exposed to winter cold; deprivation of soap and toilet
paper; cell covered with human excrement; no bed; prisoner forced to stand at
attention when guard was passing); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123
(E.D. La. 1971) (confinement for long periods without regular outdoor exer-
cise); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969) (no light; one
bed for two prisoners; malfunctioning toilet creating dampness and stench; no
soap or toilet paper); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786 (M.D. Tenn. 1969)
(no light; no means of personal hygiene; cell toilet flushable from outside; no
bed or bedding; forced nudity; cell not cleaned); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (facts similar to Hancock v. Avery, supra); Ful-
wood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.C. 1962) (confinement in cell with no
bed or wash basin, a toilet flushable only from outside cell; no reading matter,
exercise, visitors or mail and confinement later in Special Treatment Unit not
reasonably related to prison breach of the peace). But see, e.g., Novak v.
Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971) (no light; little food); Adams v. Pate,
445 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1971) (inadequate ventilation; no light except at meal-
times; water faucet inches above commode); Ford v. Board of Managers, 407
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1969) (no sink or shower; filthy cell with old mattress for
bedding; little food).
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It is quite clear, however, that what is constitutional in the prison
situation may be absolutely unacceptable in the mental hospital;
this was the position taken by the court in LoUis v. New York State
Department of Social Services'4 5 which reviewed the prison case
of Sostre v. McGinnis and found it "replete with indications that
treatment not approvable in other circumstances is permissible
in penal institutions.' 146
Lollis involved a fourteen year old girl who was confined in
a juvenile home. She was in a position similar to that of many
youths in juvenile homes, unconvicted and unaccused-a status
identical to that of nearly all patients in civil mental hospitals.
Lollis had been confined in isolation for two weeks in a small
room for twenty-four hours a day with nothing to do. She was
provided with access to a bath and shower and with a wooden
bench and blanket; she wore pajamas the entire period of time.
After granting a preliminary injunction enjoining the solitary
confinement of the plaintiff in Lollis pending the promulgation
of new regulations,'47 the court, after a final hearing, rejected
the state's provisions as inadequate. New regulations had pro-
vided for a maximum of seven consecutive days (four days in
some facilities) in isolation with reading matter, recreational ac-
tivities and ordinary clothing to be available. The court was
unconvinced by the charges; it declared:
[I]f a finding were to be made as to the maximum
period of isolation permitted under the Eighth Amendment
in the case of adolescent persons in need of supervision,
that period might well be limited, on the basis of the evidence
presented, to twenty-four hours, and under conditions in-
cluding reasonable facilities and furnishings in the place of
isolation.'1 4
In a companion case to Lollis, 49 a sixteen year old had been
placed in similar conditions of isolation. In addition, he was
145. 328 F. Supp. 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
146. Id. at 1118. The Constitutional standard is a flexible one. "The basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Because the men-
tal hospital exists for the treatment of persons alleged to be mentally ill and
because punishment for illness and the incidents of illness is inappropriate
within such institutions, cf. Robinson v. California, supra, hospital seclusion
may not meet the constitutional test.
147. Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services, 322 F. Supp.
473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
148. 328 F. Supp. at 1118 (emphasis added).




handcuffed and bound. There was a dispute over whether the
mechanical restraint was for a period of forty minutes or two to
three hours but the court declined to make a factual determina-
tion in the light of its resolution of the case. The court held that
"a minimal period of handcuffing or binding, where the reason-
able necessity for such action is demonstrated, would not violate
constitutional rights while, at the other end of the spectrum, un-





The use of seclusion and restraints in the mental hospital is,
as currently practiced, so arbitrary and oppressive as to be un-
constitutional from both a due process and an eighth amendment
viewpoint. It is conceivable that seclusion might be enjoined al-
together and that restraints might be limited to use in strictly
emergency situations.' I would fully endorse such a result.
It is more likely, however, that procedural and substantive pro-
tections such as the following would be acceptable by the
courts:.52
1. In general, patients have the right to be free from mechanical
restraints and seclusion.
2. In an emergency situation, where by reason of physical as-
saultiveness it is likely that patients will harm themselves or others
and where no less restrictive means of restraint are feasible, a
nurse may order restraint or seclusion for up to one hour or until
a psychiatrist can examine the patient, whichever is sooner. The
nurse's order must be in writing and must explain the rationale
for the action.
3. A psychiatrist may enter an appropriate written order for se-
clusion or restraints and such order must include a description
of the physically assaultive behavior of the patient and an ex-
planation of why no less restrictive disposition may be utilized.
150. Id. at 484.
151. The Wyatt v. Stickney standards for the institution for the retarded
provide:
Seclusion, defined as the placement of a resident alone in a locked
room, shall not be employed. . . . Physical restraint shall be em-
ployed only when absolutely necessary to protect the resident from in-jury to himself or others. Restraint shall not be employed as punish-
ment, for the convenience of staff, or as a substitute for a habilitation
program. Restraint shall be applied only if alternative techniques have
failed and only if such restraint imposes the least possible restriction
consistent with its purposes. 344 F. Supp. at 387.
152. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 387, for provisions regarding
physical restraints and seclusion in the mental hospital. It is unclear why these
provisions do not reach as far as those for the retarded.
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The patient shall have an opportunity to review this order and to
present his witnesses, suggestions or arguments to an impartial
decisionmaker not familiar with the particular case; the patient's
presentation shall be made part of the medical record. If the
psychiatrist's order is approved by the decisionmaker, such or-
der shall be effective for no more than twenty-four hours and
must be renewed if restraint and isolation are to be continued.
4. Patients must be clearly advised of the standards and proce-
dures used for seclusion and restraint.
5. Seclusion or restraint shall never be employed as a punish-
ment, for the convenience of staff or as a substitute for treatment.
TRANSFERS TO MAXIMUM SECURITY
Description
This section focuses on the function of the only building with
locked wards for patients at Paris State Hospital. This "maxi-
mum security" installation is a five-story orange brick structure,
the top three floors of which contain the living quarters of nearly
200 patients. Most of the patients in this building are there tem-
porarily as new admissions-after two to four weeks, transfer to
the unlocked "open" buildings is typically arranged. A large
number of the patients (nearly all of them on the top floor, the
wards with the five-room seclusion areas) are the "trouble-mak-
ers," the "management problems," and others whose actions are
unacceptable in the open buildings.1 3
In maximum security, patients sleep in crowded dormitories
or multi-bed rooms; these are usually locked during the day and
the patients' personal possessions made inaccessible. Meals are
served in small dining rooms adjacent to the wards. Unless a
person has grounds privileges (and the typical fifth floor patient
does not), the entire day must be spent in the appropriately-
denominated "dayroom" or pacing the halls. Access to or inter-
action with the opposite sex or with other patients in the hospital
is almost non-existent; homosexual activity is common. Access to
a pay telephone for out-going calls is limited to those granted
"telephone" privileges or "grounds" by the doctor.
The open buildings are a striking contrast. They are each
one story high with individual patient rooms arranged around
semi-private alcoves. Rooms are left unlocked. Patients here
have access to the entire hospital grounds, including the library,
153. Unlike Paris State Hospital, many mental hospitals have separate build-
ings for maximum security and admissions. Because the fifth floor of this




snack bar, recreation building and the surrounding wooded areas.
Meals are taken in a separate dining hall and every open building
has two pay telephones at which patients can make and receive
calls. It is not surprising that the major sanction against patients
in the open units is "being sent up the hill" to maximum security.
Staff and doctors transfer "difficult" or "bothersome" pa-
tients to maximum security automatically with scant attention to
solving the alleged behavior problem through less restrictive
means. A psychiatrist described this situation to the clinical di-
rector of maximum security in this way:
With the open buildings, you know, what they do is when they
have a little problem, very little, Dr. Smith-the patient is
a little upset or so-they don't ask anybody, they just send
those things here. We have the best example, O'Connor, the
patient asked to be discharged, so they transferred him
here. I've found that most transfers are for one reason-the
medication is too low.
Dr. Smith is disturbed by this situation and has asked the other
hospital physicians to more carefully evaluate all potential trans-
fers and to cease disciplinary transfers altogether; he says, "I don't
want to think this building should be used as a punishment build-
ing."
Another use of maximum security is made by those in charge
of drug experimentation in the research building at Paris. This
was explained to a small ward staff meeting as follows:
They have, and this is with the approval of the hopsital di-
rector, if someone doesn't work out, if they've been on the re-
search program for a while and they're not making any im-
provement, then they can unload them. Unfortunately, the
only place is [maximum security].
One patient, Roger Dawson, was transferred to maximum
security on his own request. When I met him, Mr. Dawson
wanted to return to his open building but, despite his repeated
requests, he was denied permission to do so. Mr. Dawson doesn't
know why. Aaron Chalmers was transferred to the security unit
on the decision, he indicates, of an attendant; he was given no
reason for the transfer. I met a young man, Jim Strock, the day
after he arrived in maximum security from an open building. He
and a friend had been found drinking in Strock's room; there
was a staff meeting (from which Mr. Strock was excluded) after
which the patient was told he would be "sent up the hill." Strock
was not asked to explain his behavior until after the decision.
Three adolescent women in an open building "broke restriction"
by ordering out for pizza and eating in their rooms; they were
all summarily sent to maximum security.
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This sampling of incidents indicates the variety of mechan-
isms by which patients become residents of the security unit.
Factual investigation must be limited to interviewing participants
because the medical records are uniformly silent as to the reasons
for transfer or precipitating actions. Usually the only reference is
something in the nature of "Transfer to maximum security" or
"Cancel transfer."
Worry, anger or discomfort on the part of the nurses or
aides can result in a patient's transfer out of an open building.
This can happen even though such decisions are supposed to be
made by the psychiatrist in charge of the unit. On one occasion,
an adolescent female who had been involved with drugs was ad-
mitted into the hospital and placed directly in an open building.
Despite the fact that the patient displayed no violent or threaten-
ing behavior, the nursing staff shifted the patient into seclusion
in the maximum security building just forty-five minutes before
her doctor was to arrive at the open building.
In the incident above, the psychiatrist immediately retrieved
his patient. However, other "dumped" patients remain in maxi-
mum security for an unjustifiably long time. A nurse mentioned
a man who was "caught drinking behind the open building so
they sent him up. He's still waiting to go back." Another pa-
tient, who had been placed in maximum security for setting a fire
in a wastebasket, had been declared ready to return to the open
building by the locked unit's staff but, I was told, "They won't
discuss it. They're not going to take him back."
Discussion
Increasingly during the last few years, the courts have been
willing to use the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to control the use of maximum security in institutions. Most
cases in this area have involved prison inmates but the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a standard
for transfers to maximum security units in mental hospitals.
An essential element of due process is prior knowledge of
the society's rules. In society at large and in the smaller societies
of prisons and schools, it has been held that a person cannot be
punished for violation of a rule of which he could not be aware.
In Sinclair v. Henderson,"' the court said that "[tihere must be
rules and regulations officially promulgated by prison authorities
154. 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D. La. 1971). See also Landman v. Roy-
ster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971), requiring that a reasonable definite
set of rules be distributed to the prisoners before anyone could be disciplined
for a violation thereof.
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and communicated to the prisoner apprising him of what conduct
can subject him to serious discipline, what penalty he can expect
and the procedure by which such a determination will be made
... " A rule prohibiting "misconduct" by students has been
held to be too vague to meet the constitutional requirements.155
A second essential aspect of due process is a hearing which
affords the person involved a chance to hear the case against him
or her and to make an opposing presentation. Goldberg v.
Kelly, 5 " a case concerned with the termination of public assist-
ance without a hearing, is the landmark case defining what mini-
mal due process requires. The Court held that due process for
welfare recipients required a hearing at a meaningful time, with
adequate advance notice, and with an effective opportunity to
defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting
one's own arguments and evidence orally. "In almost every set-
ting where important decisions turn on questions of 'fact, due proc-
ess requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses," the Supreme Court explained.157  In addition, the wel-
fare recipient may be represented by counsel. An impartial deci-
sionmaker must be provided whose findings must rest solely upon
the law and the evidence adduced at the hearing and who must
state reasons for his or her decision and cite the evidence relied
upon.
Recently, several cases-Covington v. Harris,""8 Williams v.
Robinson,' and Jones v. Robinson' "-have raised the question
of what would satisfy due process when a patient in a mental hos-
pital is to be transferred to a maximum security ward. In each
case, the court refused to permit a summary transfer that lacked
basic procedural protections.
The most recent decision, Jones v. Robinson, used Goldberg
v. Kelly as a guide. The Circuit Court of Appeals held that one
impartial person must interview all the witnesses, including the
patient and others suggested by him. The patient must be in-
formed of the evidence gathered from the interviews and, in ad-
dition, to the extent that it will not have an adverse effect on the
155. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). The court in that
case declared that "[tihe doctrine of vagueness and overbreadth, already ap-
plied in academic contexts, presupposes the existence of rules whose coherence
and boundaries may be questioned. . . . These same considerations also dic-
tate that the rules embodying standards of discipline be contained in properly
promulgated regulations." Id. at 167.
156. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157. Id. at 269.
158. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
159. 432 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
160. 440 F.2d 249 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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patients involved, the "accused" must be given the opportunity
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The Jones court
held that assistance of counsel was not required but that the au-
thorities could assign a lay representative to assist the patient.
While no court reporter or transcript was necessary, the court
insisted that written records should be made at each stage of the
process to facilitate possible judicial review.'' The inquiring of-
ficer must make findings of fact and give reasons for his or her
decision; an order to transfer must be affirmed by the hospital su-
perintendent.
Courts' willingness to review decisions to transfer depends,
to a certain extent, upon the hospital's reasons for the action. In
the three cases, transfers to maximum security were ordered by
staff after they had decided that the patient had violated hospital
rules-by robbing an employee in Williams, by raping a girl-
friend in Jones and by having contraband money and pills in
Covington. It is significant that the transfers revolved around
factual determinations which courts and quasi-judicial bodies are
quite accustomed to making and reviewing.' 6 2  These are not the
sort of internal administrative problems for which the medical
staff has special expertise; a court cannot avoid its responsibility
to protect the constitutional rights of mental patients by swallow-
ing wholesale ex parte decisions by hospital authorities.
Underlying the requirement of procedural due process be-
fore a patient can be transferred to maximum security is a de-
termination that confinement on such a ward is a deprivation of
liberty within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The
conditions which trigger the constitutional protection include the
locked nature of the ward, the lack of grounds privileges, the use
of a limited area for exercise, more restricted visitor privileges
and the denial of access to recreational and educational facili-
ties.16 Once it has been decided that a patient has been de-
161. Upon judicial review of the hospital authorities' decision, "Ihe ques-
tion is not whether the hospital has made the best decision, but only 'whether
it has made a permissible and reasonable decision in view of the relevant
information and within a broad range of discretion.'" Jones v. Robinson, 440
F.2d at 250-51, quoting from Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d at 105.
162. In Williams, the court explicitly stated that a due process hearing was
required when actions by the hospital rest upon a determination of a disputed
issue of fact. Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d at 641-42. The question in
lones was framed in terms of "what type of fact-finding procedure is required
before St. Elizabeth's can transfer a patient accused of crime to the maximum
security sections of the hospital." Jones v. Robinson, 440 F.2d at 250. Coving-
ton also involved factual questions including a desire by the court for a reliable
determination by the hospital staff that the patient was "likely to injure himself
or other persons" if allowed to remain outside maximum security. Covington
v. Harris, 419 F.2d at 623.
163. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d at 622.
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prived of liberty, the court must ascertain whether the decision was
reached by due process of law. The courts in prison cases have
recognized that due process is required whenever an inmate is
transferred to maximum security, no matter what the reason. 0 4
Thus, the courts have refused to draw a distinction between puni-
tive and administrative segregation:
This court is of the opinion that prisoners who are confined
to administrative segregation for the good of the instituion
should be entitled to the same minimal due process that
is already afforded prisoners who are confined to segrega-
tion for disciplinary infractions . . . . [B]efore a pri-
soner is removed from the general population of an institution
and placed in segregation, he should be notified in writing
of the charges and the nature of the evidence against him
and be given a reasonable opportunity to explain away the
accusation. We are also of the opinion that in emergency sit-
uations, such process may be postponed and emergency ac-
tion taken. But the prisoners affected should thereafter be
afforded within a reasonable time the minimal due process
that is stated above.' 0 5
Considering the paucity of cases involving transfers of mental
patients to maximum security wards, the prisoners' rights suits
in this area deserve consideration. As early as 1938, a federal
appellate court recognized the similarities between the situation
of a patient and a prison inmate. 66 The major difference be-
tween the two is that one is confined (voluntarily or involun-
tarily) for care and treatment and the other is confined involun-
tarily for punishment and deterrence as well as for rehabilita-
tion; this, however, is no justification for shortchanging those per-
sons who are patients in mental hospitals. The prison cases'
and other authorities08 have generally supported due process pro-
164. See notes 138-143, supra.
165. Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 168 (D. N.J. 1971). The sug-
gested need for emergency transfers without a prior hearing, with due process
provided as soon thereafter as possible, has been recognized in the mental hos-
pital transfer context. Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d at 644.
166. Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938). A detailed comparison
of the conditions at a treatment center and a state prison is provided in "brief
of Donald McEwan, Pro Se" in J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN AND A. DERsHOWrrz,
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAw 700-02 (1967).
167. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Beisher v. Swenson, 331 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Mo. 1971); but see Bums v.
Swenson, 430 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1970).
168. School children have been guaranteed protection of their constitutional
rights within the school social system. The courts have consistently held that a
student cannot be expelled from high school or college without a hearing. See
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F.
Supp. 1393 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Jones v. Fitchburg, 211 Mass. 66, 97 N.E. 612
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cedures prior to imposition of sanctions which constitute a
"grievous loss"'169 to the person affected.
Our society has taken upon itself to provide treatment for a
class of persons considered to be mentally ill and to afford special
constitutional protection through commitment hearings. It would
certainly be ironic if we are willing to protect mental patients
solely at the point of entry into the hospital but withdraw that
protection when greater deprivations of liberty are inflicted.
Recommendations
1. The hospital must promulgate and communicate to patients
rules and regulations which will disclose what conduct may result
in transfer to maximum security and by what procedure a deter-
mination will be made.
2. The patient must be informed in writing of charges or accu-
sations. An impartial person must interview all parties and wit-
nesses, including those suggested by the patient. The patient
must be informed of the information gathered in the interviews
and must be given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
any adverse witnesses. Lay advocates should be provided for those
unable to represent themselves; the patient must also have the
right to obtain counsel, attorney or non-attorney. Written records
must be kept at every stage of the proceedings (a tape recording
could be made of interviews and hearings) and the inquiring offi-
cer must make written findings of fact and must explain the bases
for decision. A transfer order should be reviewed by the insti-
tution superintendent.
CONCLUSION
After exploring the environment of Paris State Hospital it
becomes apparent that the unfortunate analogy between mental
institutions and prisons is quite appropriate. The analogy seems
to deteriorate only when one realizes that prisoners are incarcer-
(1912); Morrison v. Lawrence, 72 N.E. 91 (Mass. 1904); Geiger v. Milford
School District, 51 Pa. D. & C. 647 (C.P. 1944). The courts' decisions re-
quiring due process also extend to in-school civil rights issues. The court in
Stricklin v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wisc.
1968), held that students could not be suspended from school for thirteen days
without a hearing consistent with due process of law. While a temporary ab-
sence from school might have some detrimental effect on a student's education,
it is certainly not as injurious to a person as is the loss of freedom and activity
accompanying confinement in a maximum security ward. When the courts are
so careful to safeguard the rights of students to obtain an education, they
should be even more careful to safeguard the personal freedom of patients in
mental hospitals.
169. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 262.
1973]
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
ated after exhaustion of complex and extensive procedures de-
signed to insure due process of law. Even after commitment, a
prisoner is entitled to recognition of certain basic constitutional
rights. An inmate of a mental institution is generally accorded
none of these protections. Although he has usually committed no
offense, a mental patient is systematically deprived of those rights
so jealously applied in the field of criminal law and deemed basic
to the proper functioning of the Constitution. The analogy is
misleading, then, not because of any essential dissimilarity between
the two forms of institution, but due to the greater degree of op-
pression that ironically accompanies commitment to a mental hos-
pital.
The approach I have utilized in this article has been a per-
sonal one. My observations and investigations at Paris State Hos-
pital are characterized by a concern for the patient as an indi-
vidual. I believe this type of approach to be necessary because
the problem itself is essentially a personal one; those constitu-
tional rights denied the inmate of the mental hospital are indi-
vidual rights affecting the very essence of human dignity. I have
attempted to convey a conceptual framework which may help the
reader to share my concern. The recommendations following
each section, if adopted, will do much to alleviate the deprivation
of inmate civil rights. Perhaps, however, the most important ob-
jective of this article is simply to provide insight into life within
a mental hospital; only when the legal community realizes the
personal vulnerability of the mental patient will sufficient atten-
tion be devoted to his and her legal dilemma. Only when the at-
tention of the legal community is directed to the mental patient
will the chains which bind him to the archaic oppression of the
past be loosened. Once such attention is channelled in the direc-
tion of the mental inmate, I have no doubt that those energies
expended by courts and attorneys in expanding constitutional pro-
tections in the area of criminal law will be applied with equal
fervor and success to the plight of the mental patient.
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PART II: THE LEGAL RESPONSE
Mental illness can never by itself be a justifiable reason for depriv-
ing a person of liberty against his objection. Even when such
deprivations are accompanied by fair procedures, they are unjusti-
fied except on a basis-for example, a violation of the criminal
law-that would be equally applicable in the absence of mental
illness.
-- Statement of Policy,
New York Civil Liberties
Union, adopted December 9, 1968
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. . ..
The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by
men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding . . .
-Mr. Justice Brandeis,
Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 479 (1929) (dissent)
